DALAM MAHKAMAH PERSEKUTUAN MALAYSIA
(BIDANG KUASA RAYUAN)
RAYUAN SIVIL NO. 02-39-2006(W)
ANTARA
LATIFAH BTE MAT ZIN … PERAYU
DAN
1. ROSMAWATI BINTI SHARIBUN … RESPONDEN-
2. ROSLINAWATI BINTI SHARIBUN RESPONDEN
KORAM:
ABDUL HAMID MOHAMAD, FCJ
ARIFIN BIN ZAKARIA, FCJ
AUGUSTINE PAUL, FCJ
JUDGMENT OF ABDUL HAMID MOHAMAD, FCJ
The facts of this case have been meticulously
narrated by Abdul Aziz Mohamad JCA (as he then
was)in the Judgment of the Court of Appeal - see
[2006]4 MLJ 705. I shall not repeat except to
mention briefly what is relevant to the issue to be
decided by this court.
Following the death of Dato’ Sharibun bin Wahab
(“the deceased”), Rosmawati, the first Respondent
in the instant appeal, a daughter of the deceased
2
with his second wife (Puan Buruk) filed a petition
for letters of administration of the deceased’s
estate. Later, Roslinawati, another daughter of
Puan Buruk was made a joint petitioner. Latifah,
the third wife of the deceased, the Appellant
herein, and her two children were also included in
the list of beneficiaries. Subsequently, the
Appellant entered a caveat in the deceased’s
estate.
A dispute arose over the moneys in joint
accounts. The first is the joint current account
of the deceased with the Appellant (Latifah), the
Bumiputra Commerce Bank (BCB) joint account. The
second is the Standard Charted Bank (SCB) joint
account of the deceased with the Appelant
(Latifah). (This joint account was converted from
the earlier joint account of the deceased with Puan
Buruk after her death). As has been mentioned,
these joint accounts were included among the assets
of the estate of the deceased. However, the
Appellant claimed that the monies in the two joint
accounts were hers, having been given to her by the
deceased as a gift. The Respondents claimed that
they belonged to the estate of the deceased.
3
The petition was converted to a writ. It was
agreed between the parties that the principal issue
to be tried was:
”1. Whether the monies in the joint
accounts of Dato’ Sharibun bin Wahab
(the Deceased) and Latifah binti Mat
Zin (the Caveator) in Standard
Chartered Bank Berhad (SCB) and
Bumiputra Commerce Bank Berhad (BCBB)
are the property of the Caveator, such
monies having been the subject of
gifts inter vivos recognizable in
Islamic law as “hibah” by the Deceased
to the Caveator;
in the event that the answer to 1 (above) is
in the affirmative, then such monies do not
therefore fall within the estate of the
deceased for distribution between the
beneficiaries under Faraid.
In the event that the answer to 1 (above) is
in the negative, then such monies therefore
fall within the estate of the deceased for
distribution between the beneficiaries under
Faraid.”
4
The learned High Court Judge ruled that Islamic
law applied for the determination of the issue.
Applying what he found to be the Islamic law of
“hibah” and the facts before him he ruled that
there had been no “hibah” or gift of the monies in
the joint accounts to the Appellant.
In the Court of Appeal, it was argued by the
learned counsel for the Appellant that the
applicable law was the Federal law of banking and
contract. This argument was rejected by the court.
It held that the applicable law was the law of
gifts, not the law of banking or contract. The
question would then be whether the applicable law
in this case is the civil law of gifts inter vivos
or the Islamic law of gifts inter vivos or “hibah”.
To the argument that because the dispute arose
in a petition for administration, it was therefore
a probate and administration matter the court held:
“We cannot agree that a dispute about gift
is a dispute about probate and
administration, just because it arises in
the context of the administration of an
estate.”
5
and, the court further held:
“It is, therefore, our finding that the
subject-matter of the dispute in this case,
which is that of gifts inter vivos or hibah
between Muslims, is not a probate and
administration matter and is within the
jurisdiction of the Syariah Courts.”
Having come to that conclusion, the court then,
applying the provisions of Article 121(1A) of the
Federal Constitution held that “the civil High
Court had no jurisdiction over the dispute and the
orders made were null and void and have to be set
aside.”
The Court then went on to consider the facts of
the case and held that “ “hibah” had been proved in
respect of the joint accounts and that therefore
the monies in the joint accounts were the property
of the appellant.” On the same ground the court
held that the money in the Higher Education Fund
account was also the property of the Appellant.
However, in view of the court’s decision on
jurisdictional issue, the court dismissed the
6
appeal and set aside the order of the High Court
with no order as to costs.
On 16 August 2006 this court granted leave to
the Appellant on the following questions:
“1. where a question arises as to whether
specific property fall within the assets
of a deceased person who is a Muslim for
the purpose of procuring a Grant of
Letters of Administration of the estate of
the deceased, whether the High Court is
vested and/or otherwise seized with
jurisdiction to determine that question;
2. further to question 1, whether the
High Court is seized with jurisdiction to
determine the question where the specific
property is monies held in joint accounts
in connection with which mandates had been
issued jointly by the deceased and the
surviving account holder to the bank
concerned when opening the joint accounts;
3. whether the High Court is seized with
jurisdiction to determine questions or
issues:
7
a. framed in Islamic Law principles
and/or with regard to Islamic Law
principles as an alternative to issues
not pertaining to Islamic Law
principles;
b. not wholly framed in Islamic Law
and/or with regard to Islamic Law
principles; and/or
c. which though possibly relating to
Islamic Law principles, primarily or
additionally relate to principles of
Probate and Administration Law,
Banking Law and Contract law;
4. whether the Syariah Court is seized
with jurisdiction over actions involving
matters:
a. not entirely within jurisdiction of
the Syariah Courts as provided for
under item 1, List II, 9th Schedule,
Federal Constitution; and/or
8
b. in connection with which no specific
law has been enacted; and/or
c. pertaining to matters in relation to
which both Federal Law and State Law
have been enacted.”
Once again the issue of conflict of
jurisdiction of the civil and the syariah courts
has come to forefront. This problem has arisen and
has become more serious over the last two decades.
Courts, the civil courts as well as the syariah
courts have had to grapple with this problem. While
a judgment settles the case before the court, it
creates other problems in subsequent cases.
Being one of the judges who had had to grapple
with this problem since my High Court days and with
the benefit of the many seminars and conferences
that I have participated, I think I am now in a
position to take a fresh look at the problem in a
broader perspective than the specific issue arising
in the instant appeal. Incidentally, it coincides
with 50th year of independence and the Federal
Constitution.
9
While I am aware of the many judgments that
have been delivered on the issue, to avoid this
judgment becoming too long, more complicated and
may be more difficult to comprehend, I shall not
refer to or discuss them. I take note of all of
them. However, for purpose of record, I hereby
list them in chronological order:
?? Commissioner for Religious Affairs,
Trengganu & Ors v. Tengku Mariam binti
Tengku Sri Wa Raja & Anor [1970]1 MLJ 222.
F.C.
?? Myriam v. Mohamed Ariff [1971]1 MLJ 265.
H.C.
?? Ali Mat bin Khamis v Jamaliah Binti Kassim
[1974]1 MLJ 18. H.C.
?? Mansor Mat Tahir v. Kadi Daerah Pendang,
Kedah & Anor [1988]1 CLJ 796 (Rep) [1988]2
CLJ 763. H.C.
?? Ng Wan Chan v. Majlis Ugama Islam Wilayah
Persekutuan & Anor [1991]3 MLJ 174. H.C.
?? Shahamin Faizul Kung Bin Abdullah v. Asma
Bte. Hj. Junus [1991]3 MLJ 327. H.C.
?? Dalip Kaur v. Pegawai Polis Daerah, Balai
Polis Daerah Bukit Mertajam & Anor [1992]1
MLJ 1. S.C.
10
?? Majlis Agama Islam Pulau Pinang lwn. Isa
Abdul Rahman & Satu Lagi [1992]2 MLJ 244.
S.C.
?? Ng Siew Pian lwn. Abd. Wahid Bin Abu
Hassan, Kadi Daerah Bukit Mertajam & Satu
Yang Lain [1992]2 MLJ 425. H.C.
?? Mohamed Habibullah Bin Mahmood v. Faridah
Bte Dato Talib [1992]2 MLJ 793. S.C.
?? Tegas Sepakat Sdn. Bhd. v. Mohd. Faizal
Tan Abdullah [1992]3 CLJ 679 (Rep) [1992]4
CLJ 2297. H.C.
?? G. Rethinasamy v. Majlis Ugama Islam,
Pulau Pinang dan Satu Lagi [1993]2 MLJ
166. H.C.
?? Puan Hajah Amin lwn. Tuan Abdul Rashid
Abd. Hamid [1993]2 CLJ 517. H.C.
?? Nordin Salleh v. Kerajaan Negeri Kelantan
& Anor [1993]4 CLJ 215. S.C.
?? Tan Sung Mooi v Too Miew Kim [1994]3 CLJ
708. S.C.
?? Noor Jahan Bt. Abdul Wahab v. Md. Yusoff
B. Amanshah & Anor [1994]2 CLJ 249. H.C.
?? Isa Abdul Rahman & Lagi lwn. Majlis Agama
Islam, Pulau Pinang [1996]1 CLJ 283. H.C.
?? Lim Chan Seng lwn. Pengarah Jabatan Agama
Islam Pulau Pinang & 1 kes yang lain
[1996]3 CLJ 231. H.C.
?? Nor Kursiah Baharuddin v. Shahril Lamin &
Anor [1997]1 CLJ 599. H.C.
11
?? Abdullah Sani bin Jaafar (suing as
administrator of the Estate of the Late
Datuk Jaafar bin Hussain, Deceased, and on
behalf of Himself as Beneficiary) v.
Mohamad bin Bakar & Anor [1997]1 LNS 420.
H.C.
?? Barkath Ali Abu Backer v. Anwar Kabir Abu
Backer & Ors [1997]2 CLJ Supp. 295. H.C.
?? Md Hakim Lee v. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah
Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur [1998]1 MLJ 681.
H.C.
?? In the Estate of Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra
Ibni Almarhum Sultan Abdul Hamid [1998]4
MLJ 623. H.C.
?? Sukma Darmawan Sasmitaat Madja v. Ketua
Pengarah Penjara Malaysia & Anor [1999]1
MLJ 266 C.A; [1999]2 MLJ 241 F.C.
?? Soon Singh a/l Bikar Singh v. Pertubuhan
Kebajikan Islam Malaysia (PERKIM) Kedah &
Anor [1999]1 MLJ 489. F.C.
?? Sia Kwee Hin v. Jabatan Agama Islam
Wilayah Persekutuan [1999]2 CLJ 1. F.C.
?? Nuraisyah Suk Abdullah lwn. Harjeet Singh
[1999]4 CLJ 566. H.C.
?? Abdul Shaik Bin Md. Ibrahim & Anor v.
Hussein Bin Ibrahim & Ors [1999]5 MLJ 618.
H.C.
?? Yusoff Kassim lwn. Kamsiah Kassim [2001]1
CLJ 175. H.C.
12
?? Daud Mamat & Ors. v. Majlis Agama
Islam/Adat & Anor [2001]2 CLJ 161. H.C.
?? Mohd. Hanif Farikullah v. Bushra Chaudri &
Another Appeal [2001]5 MLJ 533. H.C.
?? Daud Mamat v. Majlis Agama Islam Dan Adat
Istiadat Melayu Kelantan & Satu Lagi Dan
Rayuan Yang Lain [2002]3 CLJ 761. C.A.
?? Kamariah Ali Dan Lain-Lain v. Kerajaan
Negeri Kelantan Dan Satu Lagi [2002]3 CLJ
766. C.A.
?? Priyathaseny & Ors v. Pegawai Penguatkuasa
Agama Jabatan Hal Ehwal Agama Islam Perak
& Ors [2003]2 CLJ 221. H.C.
?? Kung Lim Siew Wan lwn. Choong Chee Kuan
[2003]3 CLJ 482. H.C.
?? Majlis Ugama Islam Pulau Pinang dan
Seberang Perai v. Shaik Zolkaffily Bin
Shaik Natar & Ors [2003]3 MLJ 705. F.C.
?? Azizah Bte Shaik Ismail & Anor. Fatimah
Bte. Shaik Ismail & Anor [2004]2 MLJ 529.
F.C.
?? Norlela Bte Mohamad Habibullah v. Yusuf
Maldoner [2004]2 MLJ 629. H.C.
?? Shamala Sathiyaseelan v. Dr. Jeyaganesh C
Mogarajah [2004]2 MLJ 648. H.C.
?? Kamariah Ali & Yang Lain lwn. Kerajaan
Negeri Kelantan & Satu Lagi [2004]3 CLJ
409. F.C.
13
?? Tongiah Jumali & Anor v. Kerajaan Negeri
Johor & Ors [2004]5 MLJ 40. H.C.
?? Nedunchelian v. Uthiradam v. Nurshafiqah
Mah Singai Annal & Ors. [2005]2 CLJ 306.
H.C.
?? Kaliammal a/p Sinnasamy lwn Pengarah
Jabatan Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan
(JAWI) dan Lain-lain [2006]1 MLJ 685. H.C.
?? Lim Yoke Khoon lwn. Pendaftar Muallaf,
Majlis Agama Islam Selangor & Ors. [2007]1
MLJ 283. H.C.
?? Saravanan a/l Thangathoray v. Subashini
a/p Rajasingam [2007]2 MLJ 705. C.A.
?? Lina Joy v. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah
Persekutuan and 2 others, Mahkamah
Persekutuan Rayuan Sivil No. 01-2-2006
(W).
Let me begin from the beginning. By the time
Malaya, then, obtained her independence in 1957,
the “civil court” (as the term has become to be
commonly used now) had established itself as “the
court” in the country. Hence, the Federal
Constitution, in the Chapter on the Judiciary talks
about the “civil courts”. However, the
Constitution recognized the necessity to establish
syariah courts as State courts with jurisdiction
over Muslims only in, substantially, personal law
matters. Thus, in the Ninth Schedule, List II
14
(State List) a provision is made, inter alia, for
the creation of syariah courts.
It must be emphasized that the Ninth Schedule
is a schedule to the Constitution. Under the
heading “Ninth Schedule”, we find the following
words:
“[Article 74, 77]
Legislative Lists
List I - Federal List”
This is then followed by “List II - State
List”.
The Ninth Schedule, as it says what it is, is a
“Legislative List.”
The words “Legislative Lists” are clear enough.
They mean what they say: the matters contained in
the two lists are matters that Parliament and the
Legislature of a State may make law with respect
thereto, respectively. Anyway, let me reproduce the
two Articles:
“Subject matter of federal and State laws
15
74.(1)Without prejudice to any power to
make laws conferred on it by any other
Article, Parliament may make laws with
respect to any of the matters enumerated
in the Federal List or the Concurrent List
(that is to say, the First or Third List
set out in the Ninth Schedule).
(2) Without prejudice to any power to make
laws conferred on it by any other Article,
the Legislature of a State may make laws
with respect to any of the matters
enumerated in the State List (that is to
say, the Second List set out in the Ninth
Schedule) or the Concurrent List.
(3) The power to make laws conferred by
this Article is exercisable subject to any
conditions or restrictions imposed with
respect to any particular matter by this
Constitution.
(4) Where general as well as specific
expressions are used in describing any of
the matters enumerated in the Lists set
out in the Ninth Schedule the generality
16
of the former shall not be taken to be
limited by the latter.”
“Residual power of legislation
77. The Legislature of a State shall have
power to make laws with respect to any
matter not enumerated in any of the Lists
set out in the Ninth Schedule, not being a
matter in respect of which Parliament has
power to make laws.”
For our present purpose it is sufficient for me
to make the following points. First, Article 74(1)
gives the Federal Parliament power to make laws
with respect to any of the matters enumerated in
the Federal List or the Concurrent List, i.e. the
First or the Third List of the Ninth Schedule.
Secondly, Article 74(2) gives power to the
Legislature of a State to make laws in respect of
any of the matters enumerated in the State List.
Among the matters enumerated in the Federal
List are external affairs, defence, internal
security and so on. However, item 4 should be
reproduced:
17
“4. Civil and criminal law and procedure
and the administration of justice,
including-
(a) Constitution and organization of all
courts other than Syariah Courts;
(b) Jurisdiction and powers of all such
courts;
(c) Remuneration and other privileges of
the judges and officers presiding over
such courts;
(d) Persons entitled to practise before
such courts;
(e) Subject to paragraph (ii), the
following:
(i) Contract; partnership, agency
and other special contracts;
master and servant; inns and innkeepers;
actionable wrongs;
property and its transfer and
hypothecation, except land; bona
vacantia; equity and trusts;
marriage, divorce and legitimacy;
married women’s property and
status; interpretation of federal
18
law; negotiable instruments;
statutory declarations;
arbitration; mercantile law;
registration of businesses and
business names; age of majority;
infants and minors; adoption;
succession, testate and intestate;
probate and letters of
administration; bankruptcy and
insolvency; oaths and
affirmations; limitation;
reciprocal enforcement of
judgments and orders; the law of
evidence;
(ii) the matters mentioned in
paragraph (i) do not include
Islamic personal law relating to
marriage, divorce, guardianship,
maintenance, adoption, legitimacy,
family law, gifts or succession,
testate and intestate;”
(f) …………….;
(g) …………….;
19
(h) Creation of offences in respect of any
of the matters included in the Federal
List or dealt with by federal law;
(i) …………….;
(j) …………….;
(k) Ascertainment of Islamic law and other
personal laws for purposes of federal
law; and
(l) …………….” (emphasis added)
At this stage, I shall only make a few points
about this provision.
First, this item enumerates matters that
Parliament may make laws about. Item 4(a) allows
Parliament to make laws for the constitution and
organization of all courts other than syariah
court and under item 4(b) to provide for
jurisdiction and powers of such courts. Item 4(e)
contains two paragraphs. Paragraph (i) enumerates
matters that Parliament may make laws. However, it
is subject to paragraph (ii), meaning that, even in
respect of a matter that Parliament by virtue of
paragraph (i) may make laws, if it falls under
paragraph (ii), Parliament has no power to make
such laws.
20
To give one example, while Parliament may make
law in relation to marriage and divorce, it is not
permitted to make law on the same subject-matter
affecting Muslims because it falls under paragraph
(ii) as Islamic personal law relating to marriage
and divorce. The net effect is that marriage and
divorce law of non-Muslims is a matter within the
jurisdiction of Parliament to make, while marriage
and divorce law of Muslims is a matter within the
jurisdiction of the Legislature of a State to make.
Another example, which in fact is the issue in
the instant appeal is that paragraph (i) provides
that “succession, testate and intestate; probate
and letters of administration.” However, paragraph
(ii) excludes “Islamic personal law relating to ………
gifts or succession, testate and intestate.” As
this is one of the main issues that will have to be
discussed in detail, I shall do so later.
“Criminal law” is a federal matter - item 4.
However, State Legislatures are given power to make
law for the “creation and punishment of offences by
persons professing the religion of Islam against
precepts of that religion, except in regard to
matters included in the Federal List” - item 1 of
State List. The two qualifications at the end of
21
that sentence (i.e. “against precepts of that
religion” and “except in regard to matters included
in the Federal List”) limit the offences that can
be created by a State Legislature. So, where an
offence is already in existence in, say, the Penal
Code, is it open to a State Legislature to create a
similar offence applicable only to Muslims? Does
it not fall within the exception “except in regard
to matters included in the Federal List” i.e.
criminal law? To me, the answer to the lastmentioned
question is obviously in the affirmative.
Furthermore, Article 75 provides:
“75. If any State law is inconsistent with a
federal law, the federal law shall
prevail and the State law shall, to the
extent of the inconsistency, be void.”
Item 4(k) provides: “Ascertainment of Islamic
Law and other personal laws for purposes of federal
law” is a federal matter. A good example is in the
area of Islamic banking, Islamic finance and
takaful. Banking, finance and insurance are
matters enumerated in the Federal List, items 7 and
8 respectively. The ascertainment whether a
particular product of banking, finance and
insurance (or takaful) is Shariah-compliance or not
22
falls within item 4(k) and is a federal matter.
For this purpose Parliament has established the
Syariah Advisory Council - see section 16B of the
Central Bank of Malaysia Act 1958 (Act 519).
We shall now look at List II - State List:
“List II - State List”
1. Except with respect to the Federal
Territories of Kuala Lumpur, Labuan and
Putrajaya, Islamic law and personal and
family law of persons professing the
religion of Islam, including the Islamic
law relating to succession, testate and
intestate, betrothal, marriage, divorce,
dower, maintenance, adoption, legitimacy,
guardianship, gifts, partitions and noncharitable
trusts; Wakafs and the
definition and regulation of charitable
and religious trusts, the appointment of
trustees and the incorporation of persons
in respect of Islamic religious and
charitable endowments, institutions,
trusts, charities and charitable
institutions operating wholly within the
State; Malay customs; Zakat, Fitrah and
Baitulmal or similar Islamic religious
23
revenue; mosques or any Islamic public
places of worship, creation and punishment
of offences by persons professing the
religion of Islam against precepts of that
religion, except in regard to matters
included in the Federal List; the
constitution, organization and procedure
of Syariah courts which shall have
jurisdiction only over persons professing
the religion of Islam and in respect only
of any of the matters included in this
paragraph, but shall not have jurisdiction
in respect of offences except in so far as
conferred by federal law, the control of
propagating doctrines and beliefs among
persons professing the religion of Islam;
the determination of matters of Islamic
law and doctrine and Malay custom.”
The first point that must be reemphasized is
that, like the Federal List, it is a legislative
list and nothing more. It contains matters that
the Legislature of a State may make laws for their
respective States. [The Federal Territories are an
exception]. So, to give an example, when it talks
about “the constitution, organization and procedure
of Syariah courts”, what it means is that the
24
Legislature of a State may make law to set up or
constitute the syariah courts in the State. Until
such law is made such courts do not exist. The
position is different from the case of the civil
High Courts, the Court of Appeal and the Federal
Court. In the case of those civil courts, there is
a whole Part in the Constitution (Part IX) with the
title “the Judiciary”.
Article 121(1) begins with the words “There
shall be two High Courts of co-ordinate
jurisdiction and status,” namely the High Court in
Malaya and the High Court in Sabah and Sarawak.
(emphasis added)
Article 121(1B) begins with the words “There
shall be a court which shall be known as the
Mahkamah Rayuan (Court of Appeal) ……….” (emphasis
added).
Article 121 (2) begins with the words “There
shall be a court which shall be known as the
Mahkamah Persekutuan (Federal Court) ……….”
(emphasis added).
So, the civil High Courts, the Court of Appeal
and the Federal Court are established by the
25
Constitution itself. But, that is not the case
with the syariah courts. A syariah court in a
State is established or comes into being only when
the Legislature of the State makes law to establish
it, pursuant to the powers given to it by item 1 of
the State List. In fact, the position of the
syariah courts, in this respect, is similar to the
Session Courts and the Magistrates’ Courts. In
respect of the last two mentioned courts, which the
Constitution call “inferior courts”, Article 121(1)
merely says, omitting the irrelevant parts:
“121(1) There shall be ………………………… such
inferior courts as may be provided by
federal law…………….”
This is, of course, followed by item 4 of the
Federal List, which I have reproduced earlier. And
to establish the Session Courts and the
Magistrates’ Courts we have the Subordinate Courts
Act 1948 (Act 92), section 3, which provides:
“3(1) …………………………………………………………
(2)There shall be established the following
Subordinate Courts for the administration
of civil and criminal law:
(a) Sessions Courts;
26
(b) Magistrates’ Courts……….” (emphasis
added).
Coming now to the jurisdictions of the courts.
In the case of the Federal Court, the Constitution
provides that “the Federal Court shall have the
following jurisdiction, that is to say -
(a) jurisdiction to determine appeals
from decisions of the Court of
Appeal, of the High Court or a judge
thereof;
(b) such original or consultative
jurisdiction as is specified in
Articles 128 and 130; and
(c) such other jurisdiction as may be
conferred by or under federal law.”
- Article 121 (2).
Note that while the jurisdiction in (a) and
(b) are expressly stated, in the case of (c), we
will have to look for them in the federal law.
27
Of importance in this discussion is Article
128(1) that provides:
“128(1) The Federal Court shall, to the
exclusion of any other court, have
jurisdiction to determine ………….
(a) any question whether a law made by
Parliament or by the Legislature of a
State is invalid on the ground that it
makes provision with respect to a
matter with respect to which
Parliament or, as the case may be, the
Legislature of the State has no power
to make laws; and” (emphasis added).
So, if for example, a question arises whether a
particular provision of a law made by Parliament or
the State Legislature is in contravention of the
provisions of the Ninth Schedule, it is the Federal
Court that has jurisdiction to decide.
In respect of the Court of Appeal, clause (1B)
provides that the Court of Appeal “shall have the
following jurisdiction, that is to say -
28
“(a) jurisdiction to determine appeals
from decisions of a High Court or a
judge thereof ………; and
(b) such other jurisdiction as may be
conferred by or under federal law.”
Here again we notice that while the
jurisdiction in (a) is expressly stated, in (b) we
will have to look for them in the federal law.
However, regarding the jurisdictions of the
High Courts and the “inferior courts”, the
Constitution provides “and the High Courts and
inferior courts shall have such jurisdiction and
powers as may be conferred by or under federal
law.” So, to know the jurisdictions and powers of
the High Courts, the Sessions Courts and the
Magistrates’ Courts we will have to look at the
federal laws, in particular, the Courts of
Judicature Act 1964 (Act 91) for the High Courts,
and the Subordinate Courts Act 1948 (Act 92) for
the Sessions and Magistrates’ Courts.
Similarly, in the case of the syariah courts.
Item 1 of the State List, having stated “the
constitution, organization and procedure of Syariah
courts”, continues to provide “which shall have
29
jurisdiction only over persons professing the
religion of Islam and in respect only of any of the
matters included in this paragraph, but shall not
have jurisdiction in respect of offences except in
so far as conferred by federal law, the control of
propagating doctrines and beliefs among persons
professing the religion of Islam ………….” (emphasis
added).
What it means is that, the Legislature of a
State, in making law to “constitute” and “organize”
the syariah courts shall also provide for the
jurisdictions of such courts within the limits
allowed by item 1 of the State List, for example,
it is limited only to persons professing the
religion of Islam. The use of the word “any”
between the words “in respect only of” and “of the
matters” means that the State Legislature may
choose one or some or all of the matters allowed
therein to be included within the jurisdiction of
the syariah courts. It can never be that once the
syariah courts are established the courts are
seized with jurisdiction over all the matters
mentioned in item 1 automatically. It has to be
provided for. At the very least, the law should
provide “and such courts shall have jurisdiction
over all matters mentioned in item 1 of List II -
30
State List of the Ninth Schedule.” If there is no
requirement for such provision, then it would also
not be necessary for the Legislature of a State to
make law to “constitute” and “organize” the syariah
courts. Would there be Syariah courts without such
law? Obviously none. That is why such law is made
in every State e.g. Administration of Islamic Law
Enactment 1989 (Selangor).
(The position in the Federal Territories is the
same in this respect even though such law is made
by Parliament because such law may only be made “to
the some extent as provided in item 1 of the State
List………” - item 6(e) of the Federal List).
The point to note here is that both courts,
civil and syariah, are creatures of statutes. Both
owe their existence to statutes, the Federal
Constitution, the Acts of Parliament and the State
Enactments. Both get their jurisdictions from
statutes i.e. Constitution, federal law or State
law, as the case may be. So, it is to the relevant
statutes that they should look to determine whether
they have jurisdiction or not. Even if the syariah
court does not exist, the civil court will still
have to look at the statutes to see whether it has
jurisdiction over a matter or not. Similarly, even
31
if the civil court does not exist, the syariah
court will still have to look at the statute to see
whether it has jurisdiction over a matter or not.
Each court must determine for itself first whether
it has jurisdiction over a particular matter in the
first place, in the case of the syariah courts in
the States, by referring to the relevant State laws
and in the case of the syariah court in the Federal
Territory, the relevant Federal laws. Just because
the other court does not have jurisdiction over a
matter does not mean that it has jurisdiction over
it. So, to take the example given earlier, if one
of the parties is a non-Muslim, the syariah court
does not have jurisdiction over the case, even if
the subject matter falls within its jurisdiction.
On the other hand, just because one of the parties
is a non-Muslim does not mean that the civil court
has jurisdiction over the case if the subject
matter is not within its jurisdiction.
So, there may be cases over which neither court
has jurisdiction. It may be said that it cannot be
so. In my view, it can be so, because either court
obtains its jurisdiction from statute, not from the
fact that the other court does not have
jurisdiction over the matter.
32
The problem is, everyone looks to the court to
solve the problem of the Legislature. Judges too,
(including myself), unwittingly, took upon
themselves the responsibility to solve the problem
of the legislature because they believe that they
have to decide the case before them one way or the
other. That, in my view is a mistake. The
function of the court is to apply the law, not make
or to amend law not made by the Legislature.
Knowing the inadequacy of the law, it is for the
Legislature to remedy it, by amendment or by making
new law. It is not the court’s function to try to
remedy it.
There are cases in which some of the issues
fall within the jurisdiction of the civil court and
there are also issues that fall within the
jurisdiction of the syariah court. This problem
too will have to be tackled by the Legislature.
Neither court can assume jurisdiction over matters
that it does not have just because it has
jurisdiction over some of the matters arising
therein. Neither court should give a final
decision in a case only on issues within its
jurisdiction.
33
Until the problem is solved by the Legislature,
it appears that the only way out now is, if in a
case in the civil court, an Islamic law issue
arises, which is within the jurisdiction of the
syariah court, the party raising the issue should
file a case in the syariah court solely for the
determination of that issue and the decision of the
syariah court on that issue should then be applied
by the civil court in the determination of the
case. But, this is only possible if both parties
are Muslims. If one of the parties is not a Muslim
such an application to the syariah court cannot be
made. If the non-Muslim party is the would-be
Plaintiff, he is unable even to commence
proceedings in the syariah court. If the non-
Muslim party is the would-be defendant, he would
not be able to appear to put up his defence. The
problem persists. Similarly, if in a case in the
syariah court, a civil law issue e.g. land law or
companies law arises, the party raising the issue
should file a case in the civil court for the
determination of that issue which decision should
be applied by the syariah court in deciding the
case.
Something should be said about Clause (1A) of
Article 121. This clause was added by Act A 704
and came into force from 10 June 1988. As
34
explained by Professor Ahmad Ibrahim, who I would
say was the prime mover behind this amendment in
his article “The Amendment of Article 121 of the
Federal Constitution: Its effect on the
Administration of Islamic Law” (1989)2 MLJ xvii:
“One important effect of the amendment is
to avoid for the future any conflict
between the decisions of the Syariah
Courts and the Civil Courts which had
occurred in a number of cases before. For
example, in Myriam v. Ariff ……….”
Prior to the establishment of the syariah
courts, custody of children, Muslim and non-Muslim,
was within the jurisdiction of the civil courts.
Then the syariah courts were established with
jurisdiction regarding custody of Muslim children,
pursuant to the provision of the State List.
However, in Myriam v Mohamed Arif (supra), the High
Court held that it still had jurisdiction
regarding custody of Muslim children. Hence the
amendment.
Actually if laws are made by Parliament and the
Legislatures of the States in strict compliance
with the Federal List and the State List and unless
35
the real issues are misunderstood, there should not
be any situation where both courts have
jurisdiction over the same matter or issue. It
may be that, as in the instant appeal, the granting
of the letters of administration and the order of
distribution is a matter within the jurisdiction
of the civil court but the determination of the
Islamic law issue arising in the petition is within
the jurisdiction of the syariah court. But, these
are two distinct issues, one falls within the
jurisdiction of the civil court and the other
falls within the jurisdiction of the syariah
court. Still, there is a clear division of the
issues that either court will have to decide. So,
there is no question of both courts having
jurisdiction over the same matter or issue.
Of course, such a situation can arise where the
Legislature of a State makes law that infringes on
matters within the Federal List. I am quite sure
that there are such laws made by the Legislatures
of the States after the introduction of Clause (1A)
of Article 121 even though I shall refrain from
mentioning them in this judgment. In such a
situation the civil court will be asked to apply
the provision of Clause (1A) of Article 121 to
exclude the jurisdiction of the civil court. The
36
civil court should not be influenced by such an
argument. Clause (1A) of Article 121 was not
introduced for the purpose of ousting the
jurisdiction of the civil courts. The question to
be asked is: Are such laws constitutional in the
first place? And the constitutionality of such
laws are a matter for the Federal Court to decide -
Article 128.
Coming back to the issue of jurisdiction in the
instant appeal. We have seen that item 4(e)(i) of
the Federal List, inter alia, provides that
“succession, testate and intestate; probate and
letters of administration” are matters within the
Federal jurisdiction. However, paragraph (ii) of
item 4(e)removes “Islamic personal law relating to
……… gifts or succession, testate and intestate”
from the Federal jurisdiction. This is followed by
item 1 of the State List that, inter alia, provides
that “Islamic law and personal and family law of
persons professing the religion of Islam, including
the Islamic law relating to succession, testate and
intestate” are matters that fall within the State
list.
The following points should be made here.
First, “probate and administration” are within the
Federal jurisdiction. “Probate” is a certificate
37
issued by the court on the application of executors
appointed by the will, to the effect that the will
is valid and the executors are authorized to
administer the deceased’s estate” - A concise
Dictionary of Law: Oxford Reference.
“Administration”, for the present purpose, means
the granting of letters of administration to the
estate of a deceased person to administer when
there is no executor under the will - ibid. The
application for the granting of Probate and Letters
of Administration are governed by the Probate and
Administration Act 1959, a federal law. (To
simplify matters, “small estates” are excluded in
this discussion). It is the civil High Court that
hears such applications. In the case of probate,
among the questions that could arise are whether it
is obligatory for Muslims to make a will, if he
does, in accordance with Islamic law, and which
court is to interpret it, whether a will made by a
Muslim say, in accordance with the provisions of
the Wills Act 1959 valid. These are all live
issues.
In the case of Letters of Administration (again
I am only referring to non-small estates), an
application is made to the civil High Court for the
grant of a Letter of Administration. When the
38
Letter of Administration is obtained, the
Administrator is appointed, and in case of an
estate of a Muslim, the Administrator will obtain a
“Sijil Faraid” from the syariah court which states
who are the beneficiaries and their respective
shares, in accordance with Islamic law. If the
estate consists of immovable property, another
application is made to the civil High Court for a
vesting order. All that the civil High Court does
in such an application is that, being satisfied
with all the procedural requirements, the civil
High Court makes a vesting order in accordance with
the “Sijil Faraid”. This second application is not
necessary where the assets to be distributed are
movable assets. However, the Administrator still
requires a “Sijil Faraid” for purpose of
distribution.
Since the case of Juma’aton dan Satu lagi lwn.
Raja Hizaruddin (1998) 6 MLJ 556 has featured
prominently in the arguments of both learned
counsel and the judgments of both courts and also
before this court, I shall deal with it first. It
is a judgment of the Syariah Court of Appeal Kuala
Lumpur.
39
In that case, one Raja Nong Chik died leaving
two wives and ten children. He died leaving, inter
alia, shares in Arensi Holdings (M) Bhd. At the
time of his death, 1,464,647 shares in Arensi
Holdings (M) Bhd. were registered in the deceased’s
name while 11,095,666 shares were registered in the
name of the respondent. The applicants had
requested the respondent to distribute the shares
held under the name of the respondent in accordance
with “faraid”, on the ground that those shares
formed part of the estate of the deceased. (There
was no dispute regarding the shares registered
under the name of the deceased: they belonged to
the estate). The respondent refused to accede to
the request.
In a petition for the grant of a Letter of
Administration in the civil High Court, the Senior
Assistant Registrar made a consent order that the
Public Trustees Bhd. be appointed as administrator
of the estate of the deceased for a period of four
months to administer the undisputed assets in list
A of the petition without prejudice to any party
wishing to challenge and dispute “aset-aset dalam
senarai A petisyen” (“assets in List A of the
petition”. Could it be list B?) and without
prejudice to any party wishing to challenge,
40
dispute, add and/or amend the list of beneficiaries
contained in the petition.
With that background, the applicants made an
application to the Syariah High Court:
(a) for a declaration the the 11,095,666
share (the disputed asset) registered in
the name of the respondent are held by
the respondent on behalf of the deceased
and is part of the estate of the
deceased;
(b) a declaration that all shares, dividend,
bonus shares and/or issues received by
the respondent from Arensi Holdings (M)
Bhd., since the death of the deceased,
were held by the respondent on behalf of
the deceased are assets of the estate of
the deceased;
(c) a declaration that all beneficiaries of
the deceased are entitled to receive
their respective shares (portions) in
respect of the assets mentioned in (a)
and (b) in accordance with “faraid”.
41
To me, the application made in both High Courts
was in order. The petition for a Letter of
Administration was made in the civil High Court.
The application for the determination whether the
disputed assets were assets of the estate and the
proportion each beneficiary would receive, in
accordance with faraid, was made in the Syariah
High Court for its determination, that being issue
of Islamic law. The final distribution will
subsequently be made in accordance with the order
of the syariah court (similar to “Sijil Faraid”).
But, that was not to be.
Going straight to what transpired at the
Syariah Court of Appeal, two issues were argued:
(a) whether the syariah court had the
jurisdiction to hear the case; and
(b) whether the appellants had locus standi to
institute the proceedings as they had not
obtained the letter of administration.
The Syariah Court of Appeal held that syariah
court had no jurisdiction “in a probate and
administration matter”. That is because probate
42
and administration are matters in the Federal List
and no exception was made in respect of Muslims.
Therefore, the law applicable is the Probate and
Administration Act 1959 which, if I may add, is
within the jurisdiction of the civil High Court.
To arrive at that conclusion the Syariah Court of
Appeal referred to the provisions of item 1 of the
State List, item 4(e) of the Federal List (but
wrongly referred to as item 3(e)(ii)) and the
Probate and Administration Act 1959.
On the locus standi issue, the Syariah Court of
Appeal decided that beneficiaries have no interest
in an estate “selama pentadbiran harta pusaka itu
belum selesai” (“until the administration of the
estate is completed” - my translation). The court
relied on a number of cases decided by the civil
courts in this country as well as in England for
that proposition. The cases referred to are: Lee Ah
Thaw & Anor. v. Lee Chun Teck [1978]1 MLJ 173; Khoo
Teng Seong v. Khoo Teng Peng [1990]2 CLJ 233; Lord
Sudeley & Ors. v. A.G. [1897] AC 11; Tan Heng Poh
v. Tan Boon Tong & Ors. [1992]2 MLJ 1; Punca Klasik
Sdn. Bhd. v. Foh Chong & Sons Sdn. Bhd. & Ors.
[1998]1 CLJ 601. As a result the appeal was
dismissed.
43
The judgment has raised a number of important
points. First, in holding that the case was not
within the jurisdiction of the syariah court as it
was a probate and administration matter, the court,
in fact, gave effect to the provision of the
Constitution, which is a matter within the
jurisdiction of the civil court to do - Art. 128(2).
Secondly, in my view and with respect, while
the court was right in holding that probate and
administration were outside its jurisdiction, it
was wrong in thinking that the issue before it was
an issue of probate and administration. It was
not. From the judgment, at least it is very clear
that the third declaration applied for (that all
the 12 beneficiaries of the deceased were entitled
to their respective shares in accordance with the
“faraid”) was an Islamic law issue within the
jurisdiction of the syariah court. However, from
the judgment, we do not know whether the
contradictory claims over the disputed shares
concern the question of gift inter vivos or “hibah”
or on some other non-syariah legal ground e.g.
under companies’ law. If it was the former, then
the syariah court should have decided whether there
was a “hibah” in accordance with Islamic law of
those disputed shares and then proceed to determine
44
the shares of the beneficiaries, respectively,
according to “faraid”. If it was the latter, of
course the syariah court should not embark on civil
law to determine the question whether those
disputed shares were part of the estate of the
deceased or not. That is a matter for the civil
court. If that was the case, what the syariah
court could do was to stay proceedings until that
issue is determined by the civil court. Once that
is determined, and if it forms part of the estate
of the deceased, then the syariah court should
proceed to determine the portion to which each
beneficiary is entitled to, according to “faraid”.
That order is then filed in the civil court, which
will give effect to it. Of course, this is very
cumbersome. But, that is the only way out under
the current law. That is why I call upon the
Parliament to step in to remedy the situation. In
any event, it is not right for syariah court to
take the view that as probate and administration is
within the jurisdiction of the civil court, it has
no jurisdiction even to determine those Islamic
law issues. This is in fact provided for by
section 50 of the Administration of Islamic Law
(Federal Territories) Act, 1993 (Act 505). I shall
deal with this provision later.
45
Coming now to the issue of “locus standi”. The
Syariah Court of Appeal held that as the
administration had not been completed yet, the
beneficiaries had “no interest in the estate” to
give them the locus standi to make the application.
With respect, I think the Syariah Court of Appeal
had misconceived the situation. Administration is
only complete when the estate has been distributed.
Here, even the Administrator had not been appointed
yet. The civil High Court was in the process of
granting the Letter of Administration. It was for
that purpose that those issues had to be determined
by the syariah court in accordance with Islamic
law. Section 50 of the Administration of Islamic
Law (Federal Territories) Act 1993 makes provision
of such an application:
“50. If in the course of any proceedings
relating to the administration or
distribution of the estate of a deceased
Muslim, any court or authority, other than
the Syariah High Court or a Syariah
Subordinate Court, is under the duty to
determine the persons entitled to share in
the estate, or the shares to which such
persons are respectively entitled, the
Syariah Court may, on the request of such
46
court or authority, or on the application
of any person claiming to be a beneficiary
or his representative and on payment by
him of the prescribed fee, certify the
facts found by it and its opinion as to
the persons who are entitled to share in
the estate and as to the shares to which
they are respectively entitled.”
Note that “any person claiming to be a
beneficiary or his representative” may apply to the
syariah court “to determine the persons entitle to
share in the estate, or the shares to which such
persons are respectively entitled”. That is the
answer to the locus standi issue, not the
irrelevant judgments of the civil courts in
Malaysia and/or England.
The provision of section 50 was in fact
reproduced in the judgment of the Syariah Court of
Appeal. Unfortunately, the court took the view
that that provision could not be resorted to
“selagi terdapat sekatan-sekatan yang telah
disebutkan mengenai kuasa mahkamah sivil dalam
perkara probet dan pentadbiran harta pusaka yang
47
diberi kepadanya oleh Perlembagaan Malaysia dan
Akta Probet dan Pentadbiran 1959.” (So long as
there are limitations mentioned earlier regarding
the jurisdiction of the civil court in probate and
administration conferred to it (i.e. the civil
court) by the Malaysian Constitution and the
Probate and Administration Act 1959” - my
translation).
It is unfortunate that the provisions of the
Constitution has been misunderstood.
(I think I have to clarify one point here. It
is not my intention to criticize the judgment of
the Syariah Court of Appeal. However, as this
court has been urged to accept and apply that
judgment in deciding this appeal, I have no
alternative but to give my reasons why, in my view,
this court should not accede to the request. In
any event, the issue involved in that case is not
an ascertainment of Islamic law).
Coming back to the instant appeal. There is a
petition for a Letter of Administration in the
civil High Court. An issue arises whether the
joint accounts form part of the estate of the
deceased or not which depends on whether there was
48
a gift inter vivos or not. That gift inter vivos
here means “hibah” (the Islamic law of gift) was
agreed by the parties in the agreed questions posed
in the High Court for its decision. In the
circumstances, I agree with the Court of Appeal
that it is the Islamic law of “hibah” that applies.
We have seen that paragraph (ii) of item 4(e) of
the Federal List excludes “Islamic personal law
relating to …………gifts or succession.” This is
further reinforced by item 1 of the State List
which specifically provides that “Islamic law
…………of persons professing the religion of Islam,
including ………gifts…….” Section 61(3) of the
Administration of the Religion of Islam (State of
Selangor) Enactment 2003 (the relevant law, in this
case) also provides:
“(3) The Syariah High Court shall -
(a) ……………..
(b) in its civil jurisdiction, hear and
determine all actions and proceedings
if all the parties to the actions or
proceedings are Muslims and the
actions and proceedings relate to -
………………………….
(vi) gifts inter vivos, or
settlements made without
49
adequate consideration in money
or money’s worth by a Muslim”;
(emphasis added).
So, it is very clear that the determination
whether the assets in question had been given as a
valid “hibah” by the deceased to the Appellant is a
matter that falls within the jurisdiction of the
syariah court. The Court of Appeal was right on
this point.
The argument by learned counsel for the
Appellant that the law on hibah must first be
legislated before it can be applied is without
merit. When jurisdiction is given to the syariah
court with regard to “hibah” it is up to that court
to ascertain and apply the law. It is the same in
the civil court in relation to common law. If the
common law of England applies in a given situation,
it is for the court to ascertain what it is and
apply it. I do not think it can be argued that the
common law must be legislated first before it can
be applied in this country. That, in fact, is a
contradiction in terms.
This case is in fact similar to the case of
Juma’aton (supra). In this case, there is a
50
petition for a Letter of Administration in the
civil High Court. There is a dispute whether
certain asset is part of the estate of the
deceased, and who are the beneficiaries entitled to
it and in what proportion according to the
“faraid”. That is a matter within the jurisdiction
of the syariah court to decide, even though, in
Juma’aton (supra), the Syariah Court of Appeal held
that the syariah court had no jurisdiction to do
so. In case an application to the syariah court is
resisted on the ground that the syariah court is
bound by the judgment in Juma’aton (supra), let me
answer that question right now. Interpretation of
the Federal Constitution is a matter for this
court, not the syariah court. This court says that
the syariah court has jurisdiction. It has.
I have taken the liberty to take a wider look
at the provisions of the Constitution relating to
the jurisdictions of the civil and the syariah
courts and to point out the problems that the
litigants and the courts are faced with. This is
because, I think, after 50 years, the provisions
relating thereto will have to be reviewed and
updated to meet the present circumstances.
51
The Constitution was made 50 years ago at the
time when the Muslims in the then Malaya were
mostly Malays living in rural areas working mainly,
as farmers, rubber tappers and fishermen.
Marriages were usually within the village or the
district. Inter-marriages were very rare.
Conversions to Islam were equally rare. Indeed, at
that time anyone who converted to Islam “became a
Malay” (“masuk Melayu”). “Harta sepencarian” was
confined to small plots of rice land or rubber
small-holdings in the same District or State. The
Constitution was drafted under those circumstances
and it was to cater for such conditions that the
syariah court was established. No one then could
foresee the problems that would arise regarding the
administration of the syariah court (e.g. as a
result of it being a State court) and the
jurisdictional issues involving the syariah and the
civil court and non-Muslims involved in a matter
falling within the jurisdiction of the syariah
court.
Now, fifty years after independence during
which period Malaya had become Malaysia. The
country that was an agricultural country has
transformed into an industrial country. With
better education and economic development, the
52
Malay-Muslim society itself has transformed. Inter-
State population movement is common. Inter-State
marriages and inter-marriages are a common
occurrence. Conversion to Islam and re-conversion
happen more frequently. “Harta sepencarian” now
includes shares and bank accounts. In other words,
the conditions have drastically changed.
As a result, jurisdictional problems that had
not been envisaged have arisen. Some require
double proceedings, one in the civil court and
another in the syariah court before a final
decision may be made. This causes delay and incurs
unnecessary expenses. Others are outside the
jurisdiction of both courts. These are not matters
that the courts can solve as the courts owe their
jurisdiction to statutes. It is for the Legislature
to step in, to decide as a matter of policy what
should be the solution and legislate accordingly.
At least, as far as the instant appeal is
concerned, all the parties being Muslims, there is
a way out even though it involves double
proceedings, delay and more expenses.
I do not think it is necessary for me to try to
answer the questions as they are framed. It is
sufficient and clearer that I answer the question
53
that touches the crux of the case which disposes of
the appeal in my own way and it is this: where a
question arises as to whether a specific property
forms part of the assets of an estate of a deceased
person who is a Muslim in a petition for a Letter
of Administration in the civil High Court, the
answer to which depends on whether there was a gift
inter vivos or not, that question shall be
determined in accordance with the Islamic Law of
gift inter vivos or “hibah”. The determination of
that issue and the beneficiary or beneficiaries
entitled to it and in what proportion, if relevant,
is within the jurisdiction of the syariah court and
the civil court shall give effect to it in the
grant of a Letter of Administration, and
subsequently, in distributing the estate.
I would dismiss the appeal with costs and order
that the deposit be paid to the Respondents to
account of taxed costs.
My learned brothers Y.A. Dato’ Arifin Zakaria
FCJ and Y.A. Dato’ Augustine Paul FCJ have read
this judgment in draft and have agree with it. I am
grateful to both my learned brothers for their
comments and contributions in finalizing the
judgment.
54
(DATO’ ABDUL HAMID BIN HAJI MOHAMAD)
Hakim, Mahkamah Persekutuan
Malaysia.
Tarikh
: 25 Julai 2007.
Tarikh Sidang
: 5 Mac 2007.
Peguamcara
Perayu
: Encik Malik Imtiaz Sarwar
Encik Arthur Wang Ming Way
Cik Amelly Kok
Tetuan Malik Imtiaz Sarwar
Peguambela dan Peguamcara
Bukit Tunku Apts
Taman Tunku
50480 Kuala Lumpur.
Tel: 03 6203 6533
Faks: 03 6203 3644
Peguamcara
Responden
: Encik Pawancheek bin Marican
Cik Suzilawati bt. Ismail
Tetuan Wan Marican, Hamzah & Shaik
No. 3A-3A Suite B, 4th Floor
Jalan Selaman ?,Dataran Palma
Off Jalan Ampang
68000 Ampang.
Tel: 03 （略）
Faks: 03 （略）