【摘要】“美国对中国产品征收反补贴税和反倾销税案”，是中国运用WTO争端解决机制全面指控外国对华反补贴措施违反《SCM协定》的首次案例。“全面”是指该案涵盖了有关认定补贴存在的全部法律要见，中美争论的“公共机构”的含义是其中之一。本文对中国为解释“公共机构”所提出的十项依据逐一进行分析后得出如下结论：中国的论证严重偏离了解释“公共机构”的主题，甚至可以断言，中国并未直接解释究竟什么是“公共机构”；虽然，中国解释“公共机构”的立场（“公共机构政府职能论”）受到了该案上诉机构的肯定，但这并不等于中国政府相关部门（或受委托的律师）法律水平的高超，而是由于上诉机构的误判所致。该案显示，现阶段中国政府相关部门法律论证水平的有限和辩护能力的贫弱。该案提示，为切实提高中国在国际贸易争端中的论证水平和辩护能力，政府相关部门还需要扎扎实实地学习《WTO协定》并磨练运用技术，这比胜诉一场国际贸易争端案意义深远。本文最后指出，为实务部门提供具有建设性并可信赖的知识是学界不可推卸的责任。
【关键词】补贴；政府控制；政府权限；公共机构；国有企业
【写作年份】2012年


【正文】

　　目录

　　一、问题

　　二、“美国对华反补贴税案”概要

　　三、中国的法律依据与补贴的定义

　　四、“公共机构政府职能论”评析

　　1．论证逻辑

　　2．“美国对韩国半导体反补贴调查案”

　　3．“加拿大乳制品进口措施案”

　　4．“公共机构”的词典含义

　　5．法语和西班牙语中的“公共机构”

　　6．英语or和any的含义

　　7．《服务贸易总协定》

　　8．联合国《国家责任法草案》

　　9．《SCM协定》的目的和宗旨

　　10．商务部的“五项事实标准”

　　五、结论

　　一、问题

　　自2006年11月20日起到目前为止，美国商务部（以下简称美国或商务部）发起的对华反补贴调查累计31件，其中做出最终裁定的有26件。[1] 为澄清美国对华反补贴措施是否违背《SCM协定》并维护该协定所赋予的权益，中国运用WTO争端解决机制对美国首次提出了全面指控，这就是“美国对中国产品征收反补贴税和反倾销税案”（以下简称“美国对华反补贴税案”）。[2]

　　根据《SCM协定》的规定[3]，为满足对进口产品征收反补贴税的法律要件，反补贴调查部门所负的首要举证义务是对补贴的存在进行证明。依据《SCM协定》第1条的规定，认定补贴存在须证明三个要件：“政府”或任何“公共机构”（提供主体）；“财政资助”（提供手段或方式）；“利益”（提供手段带来的结果）。[4]

　　无论是从法律上还是从逻辑上讲，补贴提供主体（“政府”或任何“公共机构”）是证明补贴存在时需要最先证明的法律要件。在通常情况下，“政府”是当然的补贴提供主体，对“政府”含义的解释尚未引起争论。但是，《SCM协定》第1条有关补贴定义的规定中与“政府”并列的还有任何“公共机构”，而且，因为该用语没有法律定义，如果对其不做出解释将无法证明什么样的实体会构成“公共机构”。

　　在“美国对华反补贴税案”中，向受调查企业提供生产资料和贷款的是中国的国有工业企业和国有商业银行（广义国有企业），这是中国没有否认的事实。

　　中国主张：“公共机构是被赋予政府权限并执行政府职能的机构”（ a "public body" is an entity that exercises authority vested in it by the government for the purpose of performing functions of a governmental character），简称“公共机构政府职能论”。因为，“国有企业”不是执行政府职能的实体，依据中国的解释，“公共机构”将不包括“国有企业”，即“国有企业”被排除于补贴提供主体的范围，其结果，不应该对与“国有企业”产生交易的企业采取反补贴调查措施。

　　美国主张：“公共机构是由政府控制的机构”（entity controlled by a government），并将中国政府掌握半数以上国有企业所有权的事实视为其被政府所控制的决定性依据（government control established through majority ownership would be sufficient to conclude that an entity is a "public body"），以下简称“公共机构政府控制论”。商务部根据该解释，在证明补贴提供主体时，做出了“国有企业”（工业企业和国有商业银行）构成“公共机构”的认定。本文不考察“公共机构政府控制论”，主要分析“公共机构政府职能论”能否经得起推敲并提出结论。[5]

　　二、“美国对华反补贴税案”概要

　　2008年9月19日，中国依据《关于争端解决规则与程序的谅解》[6]第4条[7]，就商务部展开的对华反补贴措施向美国提出了磋商请求。2008年11月4日，中美进行了磋商，但未能解决争端。2008年12月9日，中国向WTO争端解决机构（DSB）提交了成立专家组审理争端的请求。[8]2009年1月20日，DSB成立了专家组。2010年10月22日，专家组报告公布。2010年12月1日，中国提起上诉。2011年3月11日，上诉机构报告公布。

　　在“美国对华反补贴税案”中，中国指控了商务部的四项对华反补贴措施：圆形焊接碳素钢管反补贴终裁（Circular Welded Carbon Quality Steel Pipe）[9]；薄壁矩形钢管反补贴终裁（Light–Walled Rectangular Pipe and Tube）[10]；编织袋反补贴终裁（Laminated Woven Sacks）[11]；非公路用轮胎反补贴终裁（Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires）[12]。每个案件中与“公共机构”的解释有关的受指控措施如下：

　　1. 圆形焊接碳素钢管反补贴终裁。商务部认定：中国政府通过“国有企业”给受反补贴调查的企业（Tianjin Shuangjie Steel Pipe Group Co., Ltd. Weifang East Steel Pipe Co., Ltd. Zhejiang Kingland Pipeline and Technologies Co., Ltd.）提供的热轧钢（hot-rolled steel）构成“财政资助”；中国政府通过国有商业银行向受调查企业提供的贷款构成“财政资助”。

　　2. 薄壁矩形钢管反补贴终裁。商务部认定：中国政府通过“国有企业”给受调查企业（Qingdao Xiangxing Steel Pipe Co., Ltd. Zhangjiagang Zhongyuan Pipe–Making Co., Ltd.）提供的热轧钢构成“财政资助”。

　　3. 编织袋反补贴终裁。商务部认定：“国有企业”给受调查企（Han Shing Chemical Co., Ltd. Ningbo Yong Feng Packaging Co., Ltd. Shangdong Qilu Plastic Fabric Group, Ltd. Shangdong Shouguang Jianyuan Chun Co., Ltd. Zibo Aifudi Plastic Packaging Company Limited）提供的“biaxial-oriented polypropylene”构成“财政资助”；中国政策银行和国有商业银行给受调查企业提供的贷款构成“财政资助”；中国政府给受调查企业提供的土地使用权构成“财政资助”。

　　4. 非公路用轮胎反补贴终裁。商务部认定：中国政策银行和国有商业银行给受调查企业（Guizhou Tire Co., Ltd. Hebei Starbright Tire Co., Ltd. Tianjin United Tire & Rubber International Co., Ltd.）提供的贷款构成“财政资助”；中国政府给受调查企业提供的土地使用权构成“财政资助”。

　　如上所述，商务部的四项反补贴初裁和终裁中，被认定为构成“财政资助”的钢材、银行贷款不是中国政府直接提供给受调查企业的，而是由“国有企业”或“国有商业银行”所为。如果中国能够证明“国有企业”不构成“公共机构”（补贴提供者），那么，商务部将“国有企业”提供的资源（生产资料和贷款）认定为“财政资助”的做法就违背《SCM协定》第1条。因此，对试图避免美国反补贴税的中国来讲，证明“国有企业”不构成“公共机构”是赢得胜诉的关键。商务部认定的“公共机构”涉及到中国的两种不同行业实体，即一般“国有企业”（除从事银行金融业以外的工业企业）和国有商业银行。该案中也涉及到了“土地使用权”的提供，但这是政府直接给受调查企业提供的“财政资助”，不存在国有企业的问题。

　　三、中国的法律依据与补贴的定义

　　中国指控商务部违法时，分别依据“财政资助”的具体情形提出了如下主张：一，商务部认定国有企业构成公共机构的做法违背《SCM协定》第1条1.1(a)(1)的规定，因此（Thus），商务部关于政府给受调查企业提供的货物构成财政资助的认定违反《SCM协定》第1条1.1。[13]

　　中国针对商务部认定“国有企业”构成“公共机构”违反《SCM协定》的指控，只表示其立场而已。如下所述，“公共机构”的解释与“财政资助”的解释是两码事，前者不依赖于后者而单独成立。因此，商务部对“财政资助”的认定是解释“公共机构”（ 公共机构政府控制论以及国有企业构成公共机构）的结果而已，中国无须指控商务部对“财政资助”的认定违法。事实上，关于如何解释“财政资助”，中美间并未产生争执。所以，对中国来讲，完全可以不谈“财政资助”，集中精力论证好“公共机构政府职能论”，即“公共机构”的解释。

　　二，商务部认定国有商业银行构成公共机构的做法违背《SCM协定》第1条1.1(a)(1)的规定，因此（Thus），认定政府给受调查企业提供的政策性贷款构成财政资助的做法违反《SCM协定》第1条1.1。[14] 对该指控的评论与上述相同，不再赘述。

　　中国在指控商务部对“公共机构”的解释违背《SCM协定》时，始终将其与“财政资助”捆在一起，这样做确实没有实际意义。例如，中国在请求专家组审理的第一个问题就是“The USDOC's findings that the government of China provided a financial contribution in the form of goods in the four countervailing duty determinations were inconsistent with Article 1.1 of the SCM Agreement.” [15] 在此，先考察中国指控所依据的法律规定《SCM协定》第1条[16]：

　　第一部分：总则

　　第1条 补贴的定义

　　1.1 为适用本协定，如出现下列情况应视为存在补贴：

　　(a) (1) 在一成员领土内，存在由政府或任何公共机构（本协定中称“政府”）提供的财政资助，即如果：

　　(i) 涉及资金的直接转移（如赠款、贷款和投股）、潜在的资金的直接转移或涉及债务（如贷款担保）的政府做法；

　　(ii) 政府放弃或未征收在其他情况下应征收的税收（如税收抵免之类的财政鼓励）注1；

　　注1：依照GATT 1994第16条（第16条的注释）和本协定附件1至附件3的规定，对一出口产品免征其同类产品供国内消费时所负担的关税或国内税，或在此类关税和国内税已被征收的情况下不超过已征收数量的退税，不得视为一种补贴。

　　(iii) 政府提供除一般基础设施外的货物或服务，或购买货物；

　　(iv) 政府向一筹资机构付款，或委托或指示一私营机构执行以上（i）至（iii）列举的一种或多种通常应属于政府的职能，且此种做法与政府通常采用的做法并无实质差别；或

　　(a) (2) 存在GATT 1994第16条意义上的任何形式的收入或价格支持；及

　　(b) 则因此而授予一项利益。

　　依据上述规定，补贴定义可归纳如下：补贴是“政府”和任何“公共机构”提供的“财政资助”所授予的“利益”。可见，认定补贴的存在须证明三个法律要件：“政府”或任何“公共机构”（提供主体）；“财政资助”（提供手段或方法）；“利益”（提供手段带来的结果）。

　　上述三者的法律作用分别如下：补贴提供主体得到确定后，非“政府”或任何“公共机构”提供的“资源”不属于“财政资助”的证明范围；判断“财政资助”的依据得到确定后，政府提供的资源中不构成“财政资助”的被排除于证明范围之外；市场条件是判断“财政资助”是否授予“利益”的标准，低于市场条件的提供和高于市场条件的购买与市场条件之间的差异是“利益”，以不违背市场条件的方式提供的“财政资助”不产生“利益”。

　　按照法律规定，不应打乱上述三者的证明顺序，即，提供主体是首要的，其次是提供手段或方法，最后是提供结果，三者合在一起构成补贴。若提供主体的解释和证明不能成立，剩下的要件无需证明，依此类推。

　　如上所述，在“政府”或任何“公共机构”中，一般来讲，前者的解释不会成问题，本案也未争论如何解释“政府”，关键是“公共机构”的解释。在“(a)(1) there is a financial contribution by a government or any public body within the territory of a Member (referred to in this Agreement as “government”), i.e. where:”这段规定中，除government 和 any public 以外，也出现了bodyfinancial contribution ，但是，该规定不是解释“财政资助”的依据。[17] 该条款是解释“政府”和“公共机构”的核心条款或最直接的上下文。因为“政府”的解释无争议可言，该规定在争端解决过程中的作用将倾斜于“公共机构”的解释。

　　第1条1.1(a) (1)的(i)、(ii)、(iii)、(iv) 规定的是判断“财政资助”是否存在的法律依据，这些规定也有可能构成解释“公共机构”的上下文，但其地位是次要的，具有决定意义的上下文毕竟是直接规定“公共机构”的“there is a financial contribution by a government or any public body within the territory of a Member (referred to in this Agreement as “government”), i.e. where:” 为解释“公共机构”援引上下文时，须谨慎考虑有关“财政资助”的规定所发挥的上下文的作用。

　　中国在指控中提出的in respect of the provision of goods (inputs), that the USDOC's determinations that certain SOEs were "public bodies" were inconsistent with Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement和in respect of the provision of loans, that the USDOC's determinations that certain SOCBs were "public bodies" were inconsistent with Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement，是适用“公共机构政府控制论”所得出的结论，本文考察的是如何解释“公共机构”就会得出如此结论，这样解释是否经得起推敲。

　　四、“公共机构政府职能论”评析

　　1. 论证逻辑

　　中国的论证由以下三个步骤构成：

　　一，如果反补贴调查部门不能提供关于这些国有企业（指国有工业企业和国有商业银行）在执行政府职能的证据，应该将其行为视为“私营机构”的行为，而不是“公共机构”的行为 [18]；

　　二，只有证明这些国有企业是受到政府的“委托”和“指示”（规定于《SCM协定》第1条1.1(a)(1)(iv)）后提供了原材料和贷款，商务部才能够合法地证明，中国政府提供了财政资助[19]；

　　三，因为商务部未能证明是否存在委托和指示，其认定中国政府提供了财政资助的做法违反《SCM协定》第1条1.1[20]。[21]

　　这三个步骤紧密相连，依次形成条件关系。考察一可知，不能提供有关“国有企业执行政府职能”的证据，是将“国有企业”的行为视为“私营机构”行为的前提条件。[22]如果，这一点得不到证明，剩下的二和三就无须证明了。问题是中国为什么以“国有企业执行政府职能”为前提来展开指控呢？其依据是什么呢？更大而重要的问题是，“公共机构政府职能论”能否得到成立呢？严格来讲，中国应该先解释清楚“公共机构”，因为，是否有必要提出“国有企业执行政府职能”的证据取决于“公共机构”的解释。可见，中国论证的第一步就偏离了解释“公共机构”的主题。

　　无论如何，“公共机构”的解释在前，“国有企业”是否构成“公共机构”的认定在后，“国有企业”的行为是否被视为“私营机构”与“公共机构”的解释无关。[23] 因此，在考察中国的论证时，分析其是如何回答“公共机构政府职能论”的理由最为重要。在“公共机构政府只能论”得到确立之前，中国要求美国应该如何处理“国有企业”的行为云云是无的放矢。中国只有把“公共机构政府职能论”牢固地竖立起来，剩下的步骤才具有意义，并最终达到将“国有企业”从补贴提供主体范围中予以排除的目的。

　　2. “美国对韩国半导体反补贴调查案”

　　中国为确立“公共机构政府职能论”，援引了“美国对韩国半导体反补贴调查案”上诉机构报告。[24] 中国主张：“该案上诉机构确认，依据已经确立的国际习惯法原则，国有企业实体的行为首先（prima facie）属于私人（private）行为，而且，依据《SCM协定》第1条的规定，这样的行为应被推定为不归结于WTO成员。”[25]

　　从中国援引的上诉机构报告中，能否确认到上诉机构承认的这段内容（“有关国有企业实体的行为首先属于私人行为的国际习惯法原则”）呢？被援引的上诉机构报告第112段如下：

　　Paragraph (iv) of Article 1.1(a)(1) further states that the private body must have been entrusted or directed to carry out one of the type of functions in paragraphs (i) through (iii). As the panel in US – Export Restraints explained, this means that "the scope of the actions ... covered by subparagraph (iv) must be the same as those covered by subparagraphs (i)-(iii)". A situation where the government entrusts or directs a private body to carry out a function that is outside the scope of paragraphs (i) through (iii) would consequently fall outside the scope of paragraph (iv). Thus, we agree with the US – Export Restraints panel that "the difference between subparagraphs (i)-(iii) on the one hand, and subparagraph (iv) on the other, has to do with the identity of the actor, and not with the nature of the action." In addition, we must not lose sight of the fact that Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) requires the participation of the government, albeit indirectly. We therefore agree with Korea that there must be a demonstrable link between the government and the conduct of the private body. [26]

　　从这段内容可知，这是“美国对韩国半导体反补贴调查案”上诉机构关于《SCM协定》第1条 1.1(a)(1)(iv) 规定的“委托”（Entrusts）和“指示”所做的解释。从这段内容中找不到类似“依据已经确立的国际习惯法原则，国有企业的行为首先属于私人行为，类似行为应被推定为不归结于WTO成员（政府）”的内容。可以肯定，中国所谓的“上诉机构确认的国际习惯法原则”不是上诉机构报告的原文，是其主观解释。

　　接着上述解释，中国谴责指出：商务部没有证明应该证明的问题，即“国有企业”或“国有商业银行”是否属于“私营机构”，以及这些实体提供原材料和贷款的行为是否受到了政府和公共机构的“指示”或“委托”等问题，相反，商务部依赖于有关政府大部分所有权的“当然法则”（per se rule）认定了这些实体属于“公共机构”。[27]

　　中国主张：商务部解释“公共机构”的做法违背条约解释原则的正确适用[28]，虽然政府所有权与企业控制有关，但在证明《SCM协定》第1条1.1(a)(1)(iv) 所要求的私营机构是否受到了政府的指示时，所有权在决定某一实体是否属于公共机构的问题上具有很小的影响。[29]

　　本文针对上述中国的主张或解释质疑如下：

　　一．如前所述，在“美国对中国反补贴税案”中，如何解释“公共机构”的含义是争论的主题，是如何对待“国有企业”的前提，在“公共机构”的含义未得到澄清之前，无法做出关于“国有企业”行为的定位或评价。在未解释“公共机构”的情况下主张“国有企业”应被视为“私营机构”，是脱离主题的做法。[30]

　　二．退一步讲，即使承认“国有企业的行为首先（prima facie）属于私人行为”（事实上这与“公共机构政府职能论”的解释无关）的“国际习惯法原则”成立或存在，那么其能否适用于WTO争端解决程序是尚需斟酌的问题。除《WTO协定》之外，作为适用协定，DSU明确提到的国际法[31]只有《维也纳条约法公约》（或简称《公约》），在此需要对中国所援引的国际习惯法原则与《公约》的关系做一些分析。《公约》第31条规定如下：

　　SECTION 3. INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES

　　Article 31 General rule of interpretation

　　1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.

　　2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:

　　(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty;

　　(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty.

　　3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:

　　(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions;

　　(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;

　　(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.

　　4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.

　　分析上述规定可知，条约的text是指解释条约用语所依据的context的核心内容，“国际习惯法原则”不属于text；“国际习惯法原则”不属于2(a)的 any agreement 和(b)的 any instrument；“国际习惯法原则”不属于3(a) 的any subsequent agreement 和(b)的 any subsequent practice，中美之间未签署此类法律文件，如果存在，须中国予以证明。

　　虽然，“国际习惯法原则”可能属于(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties，但其适用性不是中国单方面所能决定的，中国需要证明：“国际习惯法原则”是relevant rules，而且applicable。

　　Relevant和applicable表明，不是所有的规则都可以适用于争端当事国的关系，而是要依据当事国的国际关系来考察试图予以适用的规则。无视直接规定“公共机构”的条约文本而谈论某种“国际习惯法原则”的适用性时，需要说明其理由。《公约》第32条[32]规定了解释条约的补充资料，其内容与“有关国有企业的行为首先属于私人行为的国际习惯法原则”无关，在此不予讨论。

　　三．“政府掌握国有企业的大部分所有权”，是商务部论证“公共机构政府控制论”时所依据的事实，而不是per se rule，事实与规则不能相混淆。

　　四．虽然中国提出了有关条约解释的原则（可能是指《维也纳条约法公约》第31条和第32条），但没有做出具体的论证，而且，如果按照条约解释原则来解释“公共机构”，必须承认《SCM协定》第1条规定的“there is a financial contribution by a government or any public body within the territory of a Member (referred to in this Agreement as “government”)”是应该最先予以考虑的上下文。关于《SCM协定》第1条1.1(a)(1)(iv)的规定，不否定其构成上下文的可能性，但该条款不可能凌驾于直接规定“公共机构”的上下文之上。

　　五．如上所述，关于“私营机构”是否受到政府的“委托”或“指示”的证明，只有在国有企业被视为私营机构的情况下具有实际意义，其与所有权的证明无关，也与“公共机构”的解释无关。

　　综上诉所，中国虽然援引了“美国对韩国半导体反补贴调查案”上诉机构的报告，但并未找到支撑“公共机构政府职能论”的任何依据，不仅如此，中国的论证严重偏离了解释“公共机构”的主题。

　　3. “加拿大乳制品进口措施案”

　　为论证“公共机构政府职能论”，中国援引的另一个WTO判例是“加拿大乳制品进口措施案”。[33] 那么，该案上诉机构的解释能否支持“公共机构政府职能论”呢？

　　中国主张：某个实体构成“公共机构”，其必须被国家法律授权以执行政府或公共性职能并且其行为是对该权限的行使。[34] 在此意义上（In this context），中国对“加拿大乳制品进口措施案”上述机构报告予以说明（paraphrasing），并主张：“公共机构”应该被定义为“为实现政府性职能的目的而行使权力（或权限）的实体”。[35] 笔者认为，在提出“国有企业”行为应被视为“私营机构”行为之前，直接对“公共机构”进行解释是完全符合法律规定的做法。在此，需要考察中国为解释“公共机构”所引用的该案上诉机构报告第97段：

　　We start our interpretive task with the text of Article 9.1(a) and the ordinary meaning of the word "government" itself. According to Black's Law Dictionary, "government" means, inter alia, "[t]he regulation, restraint, supervision, or control which is exercised upon the individual members of an organized jural society by those invested with authority". (emphasis added) This is similar to meanings given in other dictionaries. The essence of "government" is, therefore, that it enjoys the effective power to "regulate", "control" or "supervise" individuals, or otherwise "restrain" their conduct, through the exercise of lawful authority. This meaning is derived, in part, from the functions performed by a government and, in part, from the government having the powers and authority to perform those functions. A "government agency" is, in our view, an entity which exercises powers vested in it by a "government" for the purpose of performing functions of a "governmental" character, that is, to "regulate", "restrain", "supervise" or "control" the conduct of private citizens. As with any agency relationship, a "government agency" may enjoy a degree of discretion in the exercise of its functions.

　　这是“加拿大乳制品进口措施案”上诉机构对《农业协定》第9条9.1（a）[36]规定的“政府”和“政府机构”所做的解释。对“政府”的解释不能取代“公共机构”的解释，从该段解释中找不到解释“公共机构”的踪影，中国在混淆“公共机构”和“政府机构”。

　　《农业协定》中的“政府”可以构成解释《SCM协定》规定的“政府”的上下文，但是否构成解释“公共机构”的上下文，是需要谨慎考虑的问题。按照中国的逻辑，也只有在解释清楚“公共机构”而且“公共机构政府职能论”得以确立的前提下，“政府”和“政府机构”的解释才具有意义，因为这些概念可能被用来说明“公共机构”具有的政府性质。

　　《农业协定》第9条中的government agency是政府机关，其执行政府只能和权限是天经地义的事情，不能与public body等同化。就此可判明，"public body" should be defined as "an entity which exercises powers [or authority] vested in it by a 'government' for the purpose of performing functions of a 'governmental' character"不是“加拿大乳制品进口措施案”上诉机构的原话，是中国依据报告所做的主观推测。

　　中国接着解释指出：“公共机构”的行为区别于私营机构行为的决定性因素不是政府所有的程度（政府在两者中均有可能保留所有权），而是实体所具有的权限的来源和性质及对权限的行使。[37]

　　在解释清楚“公共机构”之前，讨论其与私营机构的区别无法律意义，“实体所具有的权限的来源和性质及对权限的行使”表明了中国的潜意识，暗含了“权限”与“实体”的不可分割性。

　　美国提出的政府所有权是论证“国有企业”构成“公共机构”的事实方面的证据，与“公共机构政府控制论”一脉相承。“公共机构”的解释不是对实体权限的探讨，更重要的是对实体性质的确认，只提出实体权限的来源和性质远不能满足对“公共机构政府职能论”的证实，中国提出实体权限和性质只是其潜意识的重复而已。实体的性质更不能与实体职能的性质相混淆。而且，政府所有的程度与实体性质密切相关，政府掌握半数以上所有权的实体不可能是“私营机构”，相反，即使政府掌握了“私营机构”的部分所有权，仍然改变不了实体所具有的“私”的性质，只要半数以上所有权被掌握在私人手中的情况不变。

　　中国主张：在该案反补贴调查中，缺乏（美国未提供，笔者注）有关国家所有的实体被赋予并执行政府权限的事实证据，作为法律问题，这些实体的行为必须被认定为私营机构的行为。[38] 如上所述，国家所有的实体（国有企业）是否应该被视为“私营机构”的问题，客观上与“公共机构”的解释无关，这是中国观点的重复而已，无须更多议论。本文反复指出过，应该如何处理“不执行政府职能的实体”，不是中美争论的问题，为什么说“公共机构”必须是执行政府职能的实体呢？如此解释的依据到底是什么？这是中国不应该偏离的主题。

　　综上所述，虽然中国援引了“加拿大乳制品进口措施案”上诉机构报告，但并不能为“公共机构政府职能论”提供任何有力的佐证，其脱离解释主题的做法并没有任何被纠正的迹象。

　　4. “公共机构”的词典含义

　　为确立“公共机构政府职能论”，中国援引了“公共机构”的词典含义。中国主张：根据该词汇通常含义（一般来讲，词典表现词汇的通常含义或基本含义，是法律解释的出发点，其本身不是法律规则，笔者注），“公共机构”在本质上要求该机构的行为是为国家和社会的整体福祉和利益服务的，并依据政府权限或正式代表国家和社会而采取行动。[39]

　　对上述中国的主张，本文试做如下评析：“为国家和社会的整体福祉和利益服务”（中国承认）是“公共机构”的本质要求，笔者对此完全赞同。但是，为实现此公共目的，“公共机构”是否必须“依据政府权限”而行动则需要斟酌，因为，“被政府授与政府性权限”不是实现公共目所必须的手段，更不是唯一的手段，在未被授予政府权限的情况下，“公共机构”完全能够达到为社会公共利益服务的目的。中国也承认，除“依据政府权限”以外，“公共机构”还可“正式代表国家和社会而行动。如果，does so under the authority是指“在政府权限领导下行动而不是执行政府权限”，那就更能说明，被赋予权限不是必须的。

　　中国主张：第1条1.1(a)(1)规定的“政府或其他公共机构”（ a government or other public body，但法律原文是a government or any public body）明显是一致的，而且，government和public body在功能上明显是被等同的（functional equivalents）。[40]

　　笔者认为，如果government和public body是一致的并在功能上是等同的，法律没有必要用or any public body来表述，在不提public body的情况下，用government（including public body 或involve public body）更能准确表达意思，而且，这样处理使“公共机构”的含义也更加清楚。所以，依赖词典含义所得出的government和public body等同化的结论是经不起推敲的，更不能证实“公共机构”的含义。下文中还要专门讨论or 和any。

　　中国主张：《SCM协定》第1条1.1(a)(1) (iv)将此类实体（指“公共机构”，笔者注）与私营机构予以区别，要求私营机构的行为受到政府的指示或委托（以完成第1条1.1(a)(1) (i )至(iii)所列措施），这是其行为被视为政府提供的财政资助的先决条件。[41] 这是中国的重复而已，对此，笔者在上文中已做评析，不再此赘述。

　　中国主张：对私营机构行为的指示和委托的事实，将这些行为纳入了政府提供的财政资助的范围，这说明，在任何情况下，财政资助的必须条件（sine qua non）是行使政府职能的部分内容。[42]

　　笔者认为，“公共机构”与《SCM协定》第1条1.1(a)(1) (iv)中出现的“私营机构”是有差别的，该条款是在规定“私营机构”的行为构成“财政资助”的必要条件，即政府的“指示”或“委托”，但并不为解释“公共机构”提供任何依据，这也不说明“财政资助”的先决条件，即行为主体必须具备政府职能或执行政府权限。补贴提供主体和财政资助两者都是认定补贴存在的重要因素，但前者决定后者，在有关后者的规定中不存在对补贴提供主体性质的暗示。这是应该得到尊重的有关补贴定义的基本框架和逻辑结构。

　　综上述所可知，从中国引用的词典含义中，不仅仍然不能找到解释“公共机构”的有力依据，反而，中国弄巧成拙，提出了对自己不利的内容，例如，“为国家和社会的整体福祉和利益服务”就不需要非执行政府职能不可。“公共机构”中的“公共”正是体现“为国家和社会的整体福祉和利益服务”的法律用语，这句话有利于对“公共机构政府职能论”的解释，因为，政府不可能不“为国家和社会的整体福祉和利益服务”。

　　5. 法语和西班牙语中的“公共机构”

　　《WTO协定》有英语、法语和西班牙三种正式版本。不言而喻，三者具有相同的法律效率，但后两者是对英语的翻译，在起草《WTO协定》文本时，绝无同时用三种文字进行的必要，先用英语起草好，完后再翻译成后两种文字。

　　中国主张：《SCM协定》第1条1.1中，表述“公共机构”的法语“organisme public” 和西班牙语“organismo público”的定义能够证实对英语“public body”的解释。[43]

　　中国主张：根据《公约》第33条第3款的规定，三种语言所表述的公共机构概念的含义应该被推定为是相同的，而且专家组必须分析其含义。[44]

　　中国主张：法语public 和西班牙语público表示governmental，这与英语词典的public相一致，而且，在OECD的经济词汇手册（Economics Glossary）中，法语organisme public和英语government agency也是相一致的。[45]

　　中国主张：在《农业协定》西班牙语文本中，organismo público与英语government agency明显是相同的，而且“加拿大乳制品进口措施案”上诉机构明确指出，《SCM协定》第1条的法语和西班牙语词汇与英语government agency具有相同含义。[46]

　　中国主张：《公约》第33条要求专家组解释英语public body与法语和西班牙语government agency的含义相一致，符合该要求的唯一做法，就是将英语public body和government agency解释成具有相同功能，就像这些词汇在法语和西班牙语中所具有的含义。[47]

　　综上所述，中国的主张就是，英语public body和government agency的含义相同，其结果，public body非执行政府职能不可。笔者对此分析如下：

　　一，《公约》第33条第3款规定：“条约用于推定在各正式文本内意义相同。”据此可知，不同文本中的用语的相同性是推定的，不是绝对的，而且，该公约第33条4款也在承认不同文本的词汇仍然存在其含义出现差异的可能性。[48] 即使法语public 和西班牙语público表示governmental，并与英语的government agency具有相同含义，但是也不能被绝对化，依据翻译来解释用原始语言（英语）表述的public body的含义，将会破坏公约第31条规定的尊重条约用语上下文的宗旨。

　　二，《公约》对WTO专家组的法律适用未做任何要求，中国的主张不符合DCU的基本常识。

　　三，从中国引用的“加拿大乳制品进口措施案”上诉机构报告的第97段中，尚未找到有关《农业协定》和government agency的任何表述。《农业协定》中的用语构成解释《SCM协定》用语的上下文是可能的，但这并不意味着所有概念不分青红皂白可以律相互套用。

　　综上所述，用法语和西班牙语表述的“公共机构”的含义不能为“公共机构政府职能论”提供可靠依据。

　　6. 英语or和any的含义

　　在解释“公共机构”时，美国指出了用于government和 public body之间的连词or的含义，以说明两者是不同的概念。[49]

　　中国主张：or一词并不表明government和 public body完全不同或互不关联，而只是表明两者并不完全相同。[50]

　　中国主张：or一词经常将相似或功能相同的词汇连结在一起，并援引了“美国认定出口限制构成补贴案”[51]专家组对or的解释。

　　中国主张：专家组指出，《SCM协定》在第1条1.1(a)(1) (iv)中，“a government makes payments to a funding mechanism”和“entrusts or directs a private body”之间的or表明两者的功能是相同的政府措施。[52]

　　笔者认为，这里用于or两边的“a government makes payments to a funding mechanism”和“entrusts or directs a private body”，是在表明两者都是政府措施或“财政资助”（两者的共性），但or绝非将重点放在两者的共性上，而其实质意义在于区别两者，即前者指政府自身完成的“财政资助”，后者是指政府对“私营机构”的“委托”和“指示”的情况下发生的财政资助，而不是政府直接采取的措施。

　　那么，“美国认定出口限制构成补贴案”专家组是在什么样的情况下做出该解释的呢？这需要分析。

　　The phrase "entrusts or directs" in Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) is immediately preceded by the phrase "a government makes payments to a funding mechanism or". We consider that these two phrases are aimed at capturing equivalent government actions. Both are government actions that substitute an intermediary (whether a funding mechanism or a private body) to make a financial contribution that otherwise would be made directly by the government. In other words, the action of a government making payments to a funding mechanism and that of it entrusting or directing a private body to carry out the functions listed in subparagraphs (i)-(iii) are equivalent government actions. This is further contextual support for our view that entrustment or direction constitutes an explicit and affirmative action, comparable to the making of payments to a funding mechanism. [53]

　　上述内容是该案专家组在解释“财政资助”时所陈述的意见。因为，“财政资助”是这两个具体措施的共性所在（政府措施），专家组指出or两边的措施完全相同，这符合《SCM协定》规定的补贴定义。但是，把这里的or机械地搬到“政府”和“公共机构”之间并用来解释两者的关系，那就不是轻微的错误了。

　　中国也承认，or具有“表明两者并不完全相同”的含义，笔者认为用于“政府”和任何“公共机构”之间的or的实质意义在于表述两者的区别之处。“政府”和“公共机构”两者间具有共性，例如，两者均表明，是为国家和全社会的公共利益服务的。这与“a government makes payments to a funding mechanism”和“entrusts or directs a private body”之间存在的共性（中国承认）是一样的。如果，使用or不是看重“政府”和“公共机构”之间的区别和差异，作为法律用语or将失去意义，对完全相同的东西没有必要选择，选择的意义在于被选择对象具有差异，表示“选择”的or并不否定被选择的事物中存在一定的共性。虽然中国看到了共性，但是忽略了差异，用前者来否定后者是不符合or的通常意义的，完全相同的事物，绝无选择的必要。

　　中国反对美国对修饰public body的形容词any的意义所做的解释。[54]中国主张：any一词表示，属于《SCM协定》第1条1.1范围内的具有公共机构资格的所有实体，该用语不表明关于public body性质的任何含义，也不支持美国有关政府大多数所有权标准的当然（per se）法则。[55] 可见，中国也在承认“该用语不表明关于public body性质的任何含义”。

　　笔者对any通常含义的认识如下：any不是public body的定义，这是事实，不必争论；但该词汇明确表明，不对public body做限制，给public body留下选择的空间。与此相反，“公共机构政府职能论”在限制“公共机构”的性质，这不符合any的通常含义，也与其自己的解释相矛盾；“公共机构政府控制论”强调体现公共性的政府控制，政府是为公共利益而存在的，控制（大多数所有权）是保证公共性的必要手段，不加限制地理解any符合其原意。综上所述，any不利于“公共机构政府职能论”而有利于“公共机构政府控制论”，后者涵盖前者，但前者只是后者的一部分（在受到“职能”的限制）。

　　7. 《服务贸易总协定》

　　中国主张：为证实“公共机构政府职能论”可从《服务贸易总协定》中找到上下文的依据。《服务贸易总协定》“关于金融服务的附件”5(c)(i) 将“公共实体”（public entity）定义为：“由一成员所有或控制的，主要执行政府职能或实施为实现政府目的的活动的实体。”[56]

　　中国主张：该定义体现了与《SCM协定》第1条1.1相同的观点，即将“政府”和“公共机构”视为在功能上相同的主体。[57]

　　中国主张：该定义提示，当一个实体“单纯被政府所有和控制的情况下”，只有carrying out governmental functions or activities for governmental purposes时，才被视为具有公共实体的资格；一个实体在被政府所有或控制的情况下，有可能发挥政府性的或商业性的功能，只有在主要执行前者（政府性职能）的情况下，其活动才被视为是“公共”的。[58]

　　中国主张：《服务贸易总协定》第1条3(a)也提供上下文的依据。该条规定：“成员的措施是指：中央、地区或地方政府和主管机关所采取的措施；及由中央、地区或地方政府或主管机关授权行使权力的非政府机构所采取的措施。”[59]

　　中国主张：按照《服务贸易总协定》的目的，只有在非政府实体执行政府授权的权力时，才能将其行为归结于成员政府；根据《SCM协定》第1条1.1的规定，很难想象有任何合理的理由，适用更加放宽的标准将“公共机构”的行为归结于成员。[60]

　　笔者对上述中国的主张做如下评析。作为解释“公共机构”的上下文，中国所引用的《服务贸易总协定》“关于金融服务的附件”中的public entity 和第1条3(a)中的non-governmental bodies明确表明，不执行“政府职能”这些实体（包括“公共机构”）将失去意义，对此笔者无任何异议。

　　那么，以这些实体的定义为上下文的依据，能否主张《SCM协定》第1条中的public body 也必须是执行政府职能的实体呢？或者说，被中国引用的法律条款能否成为解释“公共机构”的上下文呢？这是需要慎重考虑的问题。

　　《服务贸易总协定》是为推动服务贸易“自由化”而签订的国际法规则，这一点可从该协定前言中得到证实。[61] 贸易“自由化”是指，给企业贸易活动创造自由环境，保证企业不受国家权力的限制（国境措施[62]和国内管理措施[63]），而按照市场机制展开经营活动。约束企业贸易自由的最大障碍就是国家的管理措施（权力），实现自由化的途径无非是对国家管理进出口贸易的措施进行约束和规范，这些规范集中体现在《WTO协定》中，为此提供实施和运用的框架，是作为国际组织的WTO的核心任务。[64]这是结解释包括 public entity在内的《服务贸易总协定》任何法律用语的基础。

　　《SCM协定》是《WTO协定》的组成部分，但是与规范国境措施（实现贸易自由化）的规则相比，该协定所具有的特殊性需要引起注意。该协定认可的反补贴措施，《反倾销协定》认可的反倾销措施以及《关于紧急进口限制措施的协定》认可的紧急进口限制措施，是为缓冲贸易自由化带来的冲击（给与进口产品相竞争的企业或产业造成实质损害或严重损害及其威胁）而准备的灵活性制度。反补贴措施、反倾销措施以及紧急进口限制措施被总称为“贸易救济措施”。

　　贸易救济措施在实质上是与自由贸易体制倒行逆施的制度安排，例如，依据这些协定，进口国除《关税减让表》以外额外征收的税赋或数量限制措施，均发挥提高进口产品成本并阻止商品流通的作用。因此，在解释“政府”、“公共机构”以及“公共实体”等出现在不同协定中时，应该分清不同协定所发挥的不同作用，不能看到类似概念（“公共机构”和“公共实体”）就不加分析地互相套用。

　　虽然《SCM协定》在容忍反补贴税的征收，但不是无条件的，该协定承认的是不能超过出口国政府提供的补贴金额的税收，所以，为认定补贴提供法律依据的补贴的定义非常重要。《SCM协定》除对出口补贴和国内产品优先使用补贴[65]予以禁止以外，不对补贴加以任何规范，其核心目的是为救济补贴的不利影响提供法律要件。《SCM协定》第1条规定补贴定义，是试图扩大政府运用补贴的自由度（广大发展中国家和欧洲各国）和反对政府运用补贴（美国等国家）的对立观点所达到的平衡点。

　　换言之，《SCM协定》规定的补贴定义反映了成员针对国际贸易中能够成为救济（直接救济和间接救济）对象的补贴所达成的一致意见，明确了成员试图采取救济措施的补贴的范围，这与限制国家的贸易管理措施，保证市场开放的规则相比，在性格上是完全不同的。

　　如上所述，《服务贸易总协定》在本质目上是实现服务贸易的自由化，受该协定约束和规范的是政府实施的服务贸易管理措施，例如，是否允许外国服务的市场准入以及对服务的管理要求等。[66]《SCM协定》中出现的“政府”和“公共机构”的措施则是补贴的提供，与削减货物和服务贸易壁垒相比，补贴的作用正好相反，其意义在于减轻本国企业的成本加大其国际市场竞争能力。[67]

　　认定补贴存在的要件之一的“公共机构”的意义应该依据《SCM协定》的法律意义来理解，因此，作为解释条约用语上下文的依据，将《服务贸易总协定》的“公共实体”的定义机械地搬到《SCM协定》的“公共机构”头上的做法是缺乏慎密考虑的，是经不起推敲的。总之，作为上下文，中国引用《服务贸易总协定》规定的public entity的定义解释“公共机构”的做法是缺乏说服力的。

　　8. 联合国《国家责任法草案》

　　为强化对“公共机构”的解释，除《农业协定》和《服务贸易总协定》以外，作为上下文的依据，中国援引了联合国国际法委员会《国家责任法草案》（简称“草案”）的部分内容。[68]

　　中国主张：作为法律问题，在解释适用协定时，专家组和上诉机构应该考察草案构成《公约》第31条第(3)款(c)项规定的“适用于当事国间关系的相关国际法规则”。[69]

　　中国主张：在解释第1条1.1(a)(1) (iv)规定的“委托”或“指示”的含义时，“美国对韩国半导体反补贴调查案”上诉机构引用了“草案”，尤其在上诉机构报告脚注中谈到了草案第8条的解说。[70]

　　中国主张：该段解说明确表明，国家所有权不是将国有企业实体行为归结于国家（扩张解释包括适用《SCM协定》第1条的成员）的充分理由，该解释支持中国对“公共机构”的解释。[71]

　　中国主张：上诉机构援引“草案”这段解说表明，“草案”构成解释《WTO协定》的“国际法的相关规则”，因此，在该争端中判断商务部的认定（“国有企业”和“国有商业银行”构成“公共机构”）是否符合《SCM协定》时，“草案”是可信赖的。[72]

　　笔者对中国主张评析如下：

　　一．《国家责任法草案》毕竟是个“草案”，尚未成为正式有效的国际法文件，“草案”无普遍适用性可言，而且，草案内容是否与“公共机构”的解释有关还需要中国予以说明。即使考虑“草案”具有适用性，但在解释“公共机构”时，在法律上未生效的“草案”不可能优越于规定“公共机构”的上下文的约文。

　　二．“美国对韩国半导体反补贴调查案”上诉机构在解释第1条1.1(a)(1) (iv)规定的“委托”或“指示”时，引用了草案相关条款。本文在反复重复，“委托”或“指示”的解释与“公共机构”的解释无关，在解释“委托”和“指示”时被引用的草案内容对“公共机构”的解释来讲无适用性。

　　三．确认“美国对韩国半导体反补贴调查案”上诉机构报告脚注179如下：

　　We note that the conduct of private bodies is presumptively not attributable to the State. The Commentaries to the ILC Draft Articles explain that "since corporate entities, although owned by and in that sense subject to the control of the State, are considered to be separate, prima facie their conduct in carrying out their activities is not attributable to the State unless they are exercising elements of governmental authority".

　　该段内容是对“私人行为”与“国家责任”之间关系的说明，尽管中国谈到了上诉机构报告脚注179，但并未说明，“除非私人行为执行政府权限，不然其行为不能归咎与政府”与“公共机构”的解释之间到底具有什么样的关系，有关反补贴税的法律规定中，不存在将私人行为的后果归咎于政府的任何意图和要求，反补贴税原本是对政府行为（提供补贴，并不存在非法合法的问题）的抵消，征税无非是针对私人出口行为实施而已。总之，中国援引《国家责任法草案》的相关规定无助于对“公共机构”的解释。

　　对“公共机构政府职能论”来讲，也存在否定性的WTO判例，对此，中国不得不说明不赞成的理由。“韩国影响商用船舶贸易案”[73]专家组报告承认了只依据国家所有权和控制就可以认定“公共机构”的解释，这与中国引用的“美国对韩国半导体反补贴调查案”正好相反。中国主张：该解释缺乏说服力，不能依据该解释处理问题。[74]

　　那么中国反驳“韩国影响商用船舶贸易案”专家组报告的依据是什么呢？中国主张：该案专家组不应忽略遵守《公约》第31条第(3)款(c)项规定的国际法习惯原则的强制性（the mandatory nature of recourse to customary principles of international law），专家组无视国际习惯法的做法违背了“美国对韩国半导体反补贴调查案”上诉机构明确依据“草案”解释《SCM协定》第1条1.1(a)(1) (iv)的做法。[75]

　　中国主张：只根据国家所有权或控制来确定“公共机构”的做法，与“美国对韩国半导体反补贴调查案”上诉机构的解释（符合国际习惯法）相违背。在确立“公共机构政府职能论”，该主张实质上无法律意义，这一问题已经讨论过，不再赘述。

　　中国主张：该案上诉机构解释指出，国有企业实体的行为应被推定为不归结于政府，除非该实体依据“草案”第5条执行政府权限，或依据“草案”第8条在国家的指示或控制下行动。[76] 针对中国的这一主张，笔者已经做过分析，不再赘述。总之，在解释“公共机构”时，搬出《国家责任法草案》是牛头不对马嘴的做法。

　　9. 《SCM协定》的目的和宗旨

　　在有关补贴与反补贴措施的国际贸易争端中，《SCM协定》的目的和宗旨曾被多次引用，尽管该协定没有对目的和宗旨的明文规定。在“美国对华反补贴调查案”中，为论证“公共机构政府职能论”，中国也援引了该协定的目的和宗旨。中国在引用协定的目的和宗旨时，未能提出自己独到的见解，而只是对美国的解释予以反驳。因此，在考察中国的反驳之前，先看看美国是作何解释的。

　　关于协定的目的和宗旨，商务部主张：“为防止成员规避《SCM协定》，半数以上所有权标准（a majority ownership rule）是必须的……，这样做使提供补贴的政府无法隐藏于企业的背后以逃避《SCM协定》的规范。”[77]

　　对此，中国反驳指出：如果接受美国的解释，将会给《SCM协定》的正确适用带来相当大的麻烦。[78] 中国主张：美国的解释是缺乏根据的，其理由是，《SCM协定》第1条1.1(a)(1) (iv)是被公认的，直接处理规避的条款（an acknowledged anti-circumvention provision that squarely addresses circumvention）。[79]

　　美国解释：有关“委托”和“指示”的标准过于繁琐，当问题涉及到国有企业时，政府将会巧妙规避之。[80]

　　与此相反，中国主张：如果接受商务部的观点，对政府掌握大多数股份的企业来讲，第(iv)项的规定将会变成一纸空文（dead letter），因为，专家组和WTO成员都承认，第(iv)项的规定适用于政府掌握大多数股份的企业行为的判断。[81]

　　中国主张：商务部的解释缺乏实际条约依据，将会导致《SCM协定》目的和宗旨遭到无视。[82]

　　中国主张：《SCM协定》反映了持不同观点的两种WTO成员（试图强化对补贴的规范与试图强化对反补贴措施的规范）之间的敏感平衡， 而且，“平衡”的两端明确体现在《SCM协定》第1条1.1中，其中包括依据“委托”或“指示”标准的“规范”。[83] 还有一段中国的主张需要仔细斟酌，笔者未弄清其意思。[84]

　　笔者认为，在援用《SCM协定》的“目的”和“宗旨”为自己的解释找到依据时，应首先澄清协定的目的和宗旨到底是什么？条约的目的和宗旨的法律功能在于，给条约文本的解释提供方向和原则。[85] 那么，《SCM协定》的目的和宗旨是什么呢？如上所述，对此协定本身没有做出规定，这是导致解释混乱的原因。

　　笔者认为，《SCM协定》的宗旨和目的有两个方面：一．确定补贴定义，划定成为救济（直接救济和反补贴税的征收）对象的政府措施的范围；二．确定救济措施的法律要件，以规范救济措施，例如，除补贴定义之外的补贴产品的不利影响以及因果关系的证明。[86]

　　补贴定义是采取救济措施时须证明的首要要见，自然反映关于补贴和反补贴问题的不同立场，如果在解释“公共机构”这样的重要概念时，时时考虑“试图强化对补贴的规范与试图强化对反补贴措施的规范”之间的敏感平衡，那么在国际贸易争端中永远也解释不清补贴是什么。不能把条约交涉过程中的意见分歧无条件地带入争端解决的法律适用过程并予以绝对化，正是因为敏感因素的存在，更应该尊重法律条款，现有的法律条款是起草者克服敏感问题而达成的一致意见。

　　总之，中国没有解释清楚《SCM协定》的目的和宗旨，虽然谈到了“敏感的平衡”，但对解释“公共机构”来讲无任何帮助。中国主张：this to be a baseless concern, because subparagraph (iv) of Article 1.1 is an acknowledged anti-circumvention provision that squarely addresses it。这是明显错误的，因为，(iv)是防止政府利用私人提供补贴以规避法律的条款，其并未包揽所有规避问题，该条款对“公共机构”的解释来讲无任何意义，该条款专门是为所涉实体是“私营机构”而规定的制度。在解释公共机构时，中国始终摆脱不了(iv)的魔咒，这是中国所犯的最大错误。总之，中国为解释“公共机构”援引协定的目的和宗旨的做法无任何意义可言。

　　10. 商务部的“五项事实标准”

　　为论证“公共机构政府职能论”，中国批评美国在对华反补贴调查中未适用曾适用过的“五项事实标准”（five-factor test）。[87] 这里所说的“五项事实标准”是指判断某实体性质的五项指标：政府对实体所有权的掌握；政府在实体的管理层中的地位；政府对实体活动的控制；实体遵守政府政策和利益的情况；实体是否依据法律而设立。[88]

　　中国主张：商务部在以往适用“五项事实标准”的案件中曾认定过，根据美国的法律，即使政府掌握100%所有权的实体也不构成公共机构，因此，此类实体不可能提供财政资助，除非该实体受到了政府的“指示”或“委托”。[89] 该表述确实有利于中国的观点。

　　那么，商务部是在什么样的情况下做出“即使政府掌握100%所有权的实体也不构成公共机构”这样的认定的呢？这是需要仔细考察的问题。“五项事实标准”不是法律规定，是在某实体被政府和私人各所有50%所有权（即无法判断谁是实体的主人）的特殊情况下导入的行政做法。[90]商务部是在对韩国半导体产品进行反补贴调查时做出上述陈述的。

　　根据美国的证实，这是商务部针对韩国金融危机情况下政府临时掌握银行100%所有权所做的认定。[91]这说明，在相当特殊的临时情况（政府为摆脱金融危机暂时控制银行的100%所有权）下，商务部利用“五项判断指标”考察了银行和政府的关系。这说明商务部在认定政府和企业的关系时并未将100%所有权予以绝对化。在只依据所有权的多数能够证明政府和实体之间关系时，即使是政府掌握100%以下所有权的情况下，商务部也做出了该实体构成“公共机构”的认定。[92]可以肯定，商务部有关100%所有权的认定不是自我矛盾的，而是实事求是态度的体现。

　　中国承认未指控“五项事实标准”是否符合《SCM协定》的问题，但对商务部在本案所涉的三项反补贴调查中所做的认定提出了异议。商务部认定：本调查缺乏有关适用“五项事实标准”的证据，除了政府掌握的有些企业的所有权程度以外，中国政府未提供适用“五项事实标准”所必须的信息。[93]

　　按道理商务部若不掌握实体的所有权情况是无法适用“五项事实标准”的。有关实体所有权具体情况的信息是由被调查方提供的，在受调查方不提足够信息的情况下，如何对实体性质予以认定问题，事实上是与“公共机构”的解释无关的。在“美国对华反补贴调查案”中，受指控的商务部的认定是基于“facts available”做出的，中国若试图争论有关事实和证据的问题，须先追究商务部适用“facts available”的合法性，但是，中国却未正面提出该问题，这样一来，中国的以下主张基本上就失去意义了。

　　中国主张：商务部的该陈述提示，除非有证据证明国有企业不是“公共机构”，不然商务部不能认定国有企业提供的货物构成财政资助。[94]

　　中国主张：五项事实标准与本争端对如下问题的确认是有关的，即，在调查之前，商务部承认了即使依据美国法的规定，有关国家所有实体是否具有公共实体资格的认定是多数因素和核心事实所要求的。[95]

　　中国主张：商务部将证明责任推卸给中国以对所有国有企业是公共机构的推定做出反证，这一做法无视了调查机关的责任。[96]在此意义上，中国援引了“美国对石油管材产品反倾销措施案”上诉机构报告第201段：调查机关有义务找到有关事实的证据，并评估其证据价值，以保证其调查是基于足够的事实，而不是推定。[97]

　　在中国自己未向商务部提供必要的信息的情况下，上述主张还有什么意义可言呢？总而言之，对“公共机构政府职能论”来讲，商务部的“五项事实标准”不带来任何支持，反而使中国拒绝提供信息的做法浮出了水面。

　　五、结论

　　综上所述，通过考察中国在“美国对华反补贴调查案”中为解释“公共机构”所提出的10项依据，得出如下结论：中国所坚持的“公共机构政府职能论”严重偏离了解释“公共机构”的主题，甚至可以断言，中国未能直接解释“公共机构”，中国的论证自始至终未能走出无的放矢的阴影。得出该结论的分析过程如下：

　　1．论证逻辑。本案争论的是“公共机构”含义的解释，不是“国有企业”的含义，如果不先解释清楚“公共机构”的含义，谈论“国有企业”及其行为的性质是无法律意义的。中国主张：在不存在关于“国有企业”执行政府职能的证据情况下，应该将“国有企业”的行为视为“私营机构”行为。该主张提示，要以“公共机构政府职能论”能够得到确立为前提讨论“国有企业”问题。但展开论证时，中国的论证却偏向了“国有企业”没有受到政府“委托”和“指示”的论证上，以致造成处处依赖于对《SCM协定》第1条1.1(a)(1) (iv)的解释。事实上，将“国有企业”行为视为“私营机构”行为的问题无须由中国提出，中国只有把“公共机构”解释清楚才能解释“国有企业”不构成“公共机构”的问题。《SCM协定》第1条1.1(a)(1) (iv)就像魔咒般贯穿了中国的整个论证过程，然而，这一做法并没给中国带来任何好处。

　　2．“美国对韩国半导体反补贴调查案”。该上诉机构对《SCM协定》第1条1.1(a)(1) (iv)规定的“私营机构”受到政府的“委托”或“指示”的解释与“公共机构”的解释无关，该案并不为“公共机构政府职能论”提供依据。

　　3．“加拿大乳制品进口措施案”。《农业协定》第9条中的government agency是政府机关，其执行政府只能和权限是天经地义的事情，不能与public body等同化。就此可判明，"public body" should be defined as "an entity which exercises powers [or authority] vested in it by a 'government' for the purpose of performing functions of a 'governmental' character"不是“加拿大乳制品进口措施案”上诉机构的原话，是中国依据报告所做的主观推测。

　　4．“公共机构”的词典含义。词典中的“公共”的通常含义有利于“公共机构政府控制论”而不利于“公共机构政府职能论”，因为，实体执行政府职能不是实现公共利益的唯一条件，政府控制是实现公共利益的可靠保证，而且后者包括前者。

　　5．“公共机构”的法语和西班牙语含义。《维也纳条约法公约》第33条关于法语和西班牙语等不同语言所表述的同一概念具有相同含义的规定不是绝对的，《WTO协定》的英语文本后来被翻译成了法语和西班牙语，用后者来决定前者的做法是不可取的。

　　6．英语的or和any的含义。or的通常含义在于表述可选择性，any的通常含义在于表述不限制其后面的词汇所表述的事物，这些用语的含义明显不利于“公共机构政府职能论”。

　　7．《服务贸易总协定》。该协定中的“政府”和“政府机构”及其行为的性质，与《SCM协定》第1条规定的政府和公共机构及其行为的性质相差甚远，前者是对服务的管理，后者是政府对市场资源分配机制的介入，两者的概念不能相互套用，不能从《WTO协定》中机械地寻找解释条约用语的上下文。

　　8．联合国《国家责任法草案》。该草案有关“私营机构”行为归咎于国家的条件（受到政府的“指示”）与《SCM协定》第1条规定的“公共机构”的解释实质上没有关系。

　　9．《SCM协定》的目的和宗旨。中国未解释清楚《SCM协定》的目的和宗旨，也没有找到解释“公共机构”的依据。中国提出“敏感的平衡”与“公共机构”的解释无关，中国提出《SCM协定》第1条1.1（1）（a）（iv）是防止规避的规定，与“公共机构”的解释无关。

　　10．商务部的“五项事实指标”。在针对中国出口产品的反补贴调查中，商务部未适用“五项事实指标”是因为中国未提供有关国有企业所有权实际情况的信息。商务部依据“facts available”，做出了“国有企业受政府控制”的认定，中国应该反驳该做法，但中国未正面提出这一问题。关于“即使政府掌握100%所有权的实体也不构成公共机构”的言论，是商务部在韩国金融危机的特殊情况下对国家掌握银行所有权的情况所做的认定，这并不表明，商务部对“公共机构政府控制论”的否定，对中国的“公共机构政府职能论”来讲是无任何帮助的。

　　中国关于“公共机构”的解释是在WTO争端解决案件中受到上诉机构肯定的少有的问题之一，尽管如此，这不是令中国学界感到高兴和自我满足的事情。中国WTO法学界应该客观、缜密、冷静、认真地分析国际贸易争端并从中提炼出富有建设性的和可信赖的知识，这样不仅为实务部门提供有力的帮助，更重要的是有利于攻读硕博士课程的学生和广大青年教师，以帮助他们增长知识并开拓智慧。

　　参考文献：美国对华反补贴调查终裁备忘录

　　26．高压钢瓶反补贴终裁备忘录：Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final Determination in the Countervailing Duty Investigation of High Pressure Steel Cylinders from the People’s Republic of China (April 30, 2012)

　　25．镀锌钢丝反补贴终裁备忘录：Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final Determination in the Countervailing Duty Investigation of Galvanized Steel Wire from the People’s Republic of China (March 19, 2012)

　　24．钢制轮毂反补贴终裁备忘录：Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final Determination Countervailing Duty (CVD) Investigation: Certain Steel Wheels from the Peoples Republic of China（March 16, 2012）

　　23．复合木地板反补贴终裁备忘录：Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final Determination in the Countervailing Duty Investigation of Multilayered Wood Flooring from the Peoples Republic of China（October 11, 2011）

　　22．铝型材反补贴终裁备忘录：Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final Determination in the Countervailing Duty Investigation of Aluminum Extrusions from the Peoples Republic of China（March 28, 2011）

　　21．钻管反补贴终裁备忘录：Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final Determination in the Countervailing Duty Investigation of Drill Pipe from the Peoples Republic of China（January, 2011）

　　20．高质量打印用铜版纸反补贴终裁备忘录： Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final Determination in the Countervailing Duty Investigation of Certain Coated Paper Suitable for High-Quality Print Graphics Using Sheet-Fed Presses from the Peoples Republic of China（September 20, 2010）

　　19．无缝碳钢和合金钢标准管、管线管和压力管反补贴终裁备忘录：Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final Determination in the Countervailing Duty Investigation of Certain Seamless Carbon and Alloy Steel Standard, Line, and Pressure Pipe (SeamlessPipe) from th e Peoples Republic of Chin（September 10, 2010）

　　18．镁碳砖反补贴终裁备忘录：Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination: Certain Magnesia Carbon Bricks （July 26, 2010）

　　17．窄幅编织袋反补贴终裁备忘录：Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final Determination in the Countervailing Duty Investigation of Narrow Woven Ribbons with Woven Selvedge from the Peoples Republic of China（July 12, 2010）

　　16．钢丝层板反补贴终裁备忘录：Issues and Decision Memorandum for Final Determination Countervailing Duty Investigation: Wire Decking from the Peoples Republic of Chin（June 3, 2010）

　　15．钢格板反补贴终裁备忘录：Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination: Certain Steel Grating from the Peoples Republic of China（May 28, 2010）

　　14．钢绞线反补贴终裁备忘录：Issues and Decision Memorandum for Final Determination Pre-Stressed Concrete Steel Wire Strand from the Peoples Republic of Chin （May 14, 2010）

　　13．石油管材反补贴终裁备忘录：Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final Determination in the Countervailing Duty Investigation of Certain Oil Country Tubular Goods (OCTG) from the Peoples Republic of China（November 23, 2009）

　　12．厨房用金属架反补贴终裁备忘录：Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final Determination in the Countervailing Duty Investigation of Certain Kitchen Appliance

　　Shelving and Racks from the People’s Republic of China（July 20, 2009）

　　11．后拖式草地维护设备及相关零部件反补贴终裁备忘录：Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final Determination in the Countervailing Duty Investigation of Certain Tow-Behind Lawn Groomers and Parts Thereof from the People’s Republic of China（June 12, 2009）

　　10．柠檬酸及柠檬酸盐反补贴终裁备忘录：Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final Determination in the Countervailing Duty Investigation of Citric Acid and Certain Citrate Salts from the People’s Republic of China（April 6, 2009）

　　9．不锈钢焊接压力管反补贴终裁备忘录：Issues and Decision Memorandum for Final Determination: Countervailing Duty Investigation on Certain Welded Austenitic Stainless Pressure Pipe from the People’s Republic of China (January 21, 2009)

　　8．环形碳素管线管反补贴终裁备忘录： Issues and Decision Memorandum for Final Determination in the Countervailing Duty Investigation of Circular Welded Carbon Quality Steel Line Pipe (Line Pipe) from the People’s Republic of China (November 17, 2008)

　　7．低克重热敏纸：Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final Determination in the Countervailing Duty Investigation of Lightweight Thermal Paper from the People’s Republic of China (September 25, 2008)

　　6．非公路用轮胎反补贴终裁备忘录：Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination: Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires (OTR Tires) from the People‘s Republic of China (July 7, 2008)

　　5．软磁铁反补贴终裁备忘录：Issues and Decision Memorandum for Final Determination in the Countervailing Duty Investigation of Raw Flexible Magnets from the People’s Republic of China (July 2, 2008)

　　4．编织袋反补贴终裁备忘录Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination: Laminated Woven Sacks from the People’s Republic of China (June 16, 2008)

　　3．薄壁矩形钢管反补贴终裁备忘录：Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final Determination in the Countervailing Duty Investigation of Light-Walled Rectangular Pipe and Tube from the People’s Republic of China (June 13, 2008)

　　2．圆形焊接碳素钢管反补贴终裁备忘录：Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final Determination in the Countervailing Duty Investigation of Circular Welded Carbon Quality Steel Pipe from the People’s Republic of China (May 29, 2008)

　　1．铜版纸反补贴终裁备忘录：Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final Determination in the Countervailing Duty Investigation of Coated Free Sheet from the People’s Republic of China (October 17, 2007)

　　关于这些反补贴措施的更加详细的情况请参阅商务部国际贸易署进口局官方网：//ia.ita.doc.gov/frn/summary/prc/prc-fr.htm（2012年6月30日）




【作者简介】
白巴跟，汕头大学法学院教授。


【注释】

[1] 这是笔者的初略统计。由于篇幅所限，本文不具体介绍全部案件，将美国对华反补贴调查终裁备忘录的中英文对照列于参考文献中。
[2] 虽然该案名称中包括反倾销，但在具体争论中涉及到反倾销的只有对“双反调查”的指控，即商务部对中国的同一出口产品同时展开反倾销和反补贴调查并同时征收反倾销税和反补贴税。事实上，该案的争论和审议集中在反补贴问题上，该案是地地道道的有关反补贴措施的贸易争端。该案专家组和上诉机构的报告如下：WT/DS379/R: UNITED STATES – DEFINITIVE ANTI-DUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTIES ON CERTAIN PRODUCTS FROM CHINA (22 October 2010, Report of the Panel ) ; WT/DS379/AB/R: united states – definitive anti-dumping and countervailing duties on certain products from china (11 March 2011, Report of the Appellate Body). 本文只对专家组报告进行了分析，引用时简称Panel Report(379) ，因为中国在该案上诉机构中未提出实质性的新观点，故本文未分析上诉机构报告。
[3] Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
Article 19: Imposition and Collection of Countervailing Duties
19.1 If, after reasonable efforts have been made to complete consultations, a Member makes a final determination of the existence and amount of the subsidy and that, through the effects of the subsidy, the subsidized imports are causing injury, it may impose a countervailing duty in accordance with the provisions of this Article unless the subsidy or subsidies are withdrawn.
[4] 虽然无“接受者”无补贴意义可言，但《SCM协定》第1条并未将“接受者”规定在补贴定义中，协定第2条做出了关于接受者的规定。接受者需满足的法律要件就是“专向性”。 Article 2 Specificity
2.1 In order to determine whether a subsidy, as defined in paragraph 1 of Article 1, is specific to an enterprise or industry or group of enterprises or industries (referred to in this Agreement as "certain enterprises") within the jurisdiction of the granting authority, the following principles shall apply:
(a) Where the granting authority, or the legislation pursuant to which the granting authority operates, explicitly limits access to a subsidy to certain enterprises, such subsidy shall be specific.
(b) Where the granting authority, or the legislation pursuant to which the granting authority operates, establishes objective criteria or conditions governing the eligibility for, and the amount of, a subsidy, specificity shall not exist, provided that the eligibility is automatic and that such criteria and conditions are strictly adhered to. The criteria or conditions must be clearly spelled out in law, regulation, or other official document, so as to be capable of verification.
(c) If, notwithstanding any appearance of non-specificity resulting from the application of the principles laid down in subparagraphs (a) and (b), there are reasons to believe that the subsidy may in fact be specific, other factors may be considered. Such factors are: use of a subsidy programme by a limited number of certain enterprises, predominant use by certain enterprises, the granting of disproportionately large amounts of subsidy to certain enterprises, and the manner in which discretion has been exercised by the granting authority in the decision to grant a subsidy. In applying this subparagraph, account shall be taken of the extent of diversification of economic activities within the jurisdiction of the granting authority, as well as of the length of time during which the subsidy programme has been in operation.
2.2 A subsidy which is limited to certain enterprises located within a designated geographical region within the jurisdiction of the granting authority shall be specific. It is understood that the setting or change of generally applicable tax rates by all levels of government entitled to do so shall not be deemed to be a specific subsidy for the purposes of this Agreement.
[5] 毋庸置疑，准确解释“公共机构”的含义，关系到《SCM协定》的正确适用。笔者认为，“美国对华反补贴税案”上诉机构对“公共机构”的解释存在严重的错误，请有兴趣的读者参考拙文：《“公共机构”的解释及“国有企业”是否构成“公共机构” ——“美国对华反倾销和反补贴调查案”上诉机构观点质疑》，载北京大学法律信息网法律在线：//article.chinalawinfo.com/Article_Detail.asp?ArticleID=68325（2012年6月30日）本文将该案名称改为“美国对中国产品征收反补贴税和反倾销税案”，这样更忠实于WTO法律文件的英文名称。
[6] UNDERSTANDING ON RULES AND PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES（以下简称DSU）
[7] DSU Article 4 Consultations
2. Each Member undertakes to accord sympathetic consideration to and afford adequate opportunity for consultation regarding any representations made by another Member concerning measures affecting the operation of any covered agreement taken within the territory of the former.
[8] DSU Article 6 Establishment of Panels
1. If the complaining party so requests, a panel shall be established at the latest at the DSB meeting following that at which the request first appears as an item on the DSB's agenda, unless at that meeting the DSB decides by consensus not to establish a panel.
[9] 反补贴调查通知：Notice of Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigation: Circular Welded Carbon Quality Steel Pipe from the People's Republic of China, p. 42546. 反补贴调查初裁：Circular Welded Carbon Quality Steel Pipe from the People's Republic of China: Preliminary Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination; Preliminary Affirmative Determination of Critical Circumstances; and Alignment of Final Countervailing Duty Determination with Final Antidumping Duty Determinatio, p. 63876. 反补贴调查终裁：Circular Welded Carbon Quality Steel Pipe from the People's Republic of China: Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination and Final Affirmative Determination of Critical Circumstances, p. 42547.
[10] 反补贴调查通知：Notice of Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigation: Light–Walled Rectangular Pipe and Tube from the People's Republic of China pp, 40281 and 40283.. 反补贴调查初裁：Light–Walled Rectangular Pipe and Tube from the People's Republic of China: Preliminary Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination and Alignment of Final Countervailing Duty Determination with Final Antidumping Duty Determination, p.67703. 反补贴调查终裁：Light–Walled Rectangular Pipe and Tube from the People's Republic of China: Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Investigation Determination, p. 35643.
[11] 反补贴调查通知：Laminated Woven Sacks from the People's Republic of China: Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigation, pp. 40839-40840. 反补贴调查初裁：Laminated Woven Sacks from the People's Republic of China: preliminary Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination; Preliminary Affirmative Determination of Critical Circumstances, In Part; and Alignment of Final Countervailing Duty Determination With Final Antidumping Duty Determination, pp. 67893-67894. 反补贴调查终裁：Laminated Woven Sacks From the People’s Republic of China: Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination and Final Affirmative Determination, in Part, of Critical Circumstances, pp. 35639-35640.
[12] 反补贴调查通知：Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires From the People's Republic of China: Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigation, pp. 44122 and 44124. 反补贴调查初裁：Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires From the People's Republic of China: Preliminary Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination, p. 71361. 反补贴调查终裁：Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires From the People's Republic of China: Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination and Final Negative Determination of Critical Circumstances, p. 40481.
[13] 原文：China claims, in respect of the provision of goods (inputs), that the USDOC's determinations that certain SOEs were "public bodies" were inconsistent with Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement. Thus, China argues, the USDOC's findings in the four countervailing duty investigations of financial contributions by a government in the form of provision of goods to respondent producers were inconsistent with Article 1.1 of the SCM Agreement. Panel Report(379) , para. 8.2.
[14] 原文：China claims, in respect of the provision of loans, that the USDOC's determinations that certain SOCBs were "public bodies" were inconsistent with Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement. Thus, China argues, the USDOC's finding in the OTR countervailing duty investigation of financial contribution by a government in the form of alleged "policy lending" was inconsistent with Article 1.1 of the SCM Agreement. Panel Report(379) , para. 8.2.
[15] Panel Report(379) , para. 3.1.
[16] AGREEMENT ON SUBSIDIES AND COUNTEVAILING MEASURES
Part I: General Provisions
Article 1: Definition of a Subsidy
1.1 For the purpose of this Agreement, a subsidy shall be deemed to exist if:
(a)(1) there is a financial contribution by a government or any public body within the territory of a Member (referred to in this Agreement as “government”), i.e. where:
(i) a government practice involves a direct transfer of funds (e.g. grants, loans, and equity infusion), potential direct transfers of funds or liabilities (e.g. loan guarantees);
(ii) government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or not collected (e.g. fiscal incentives such as tax credits)1;
1. In accordance with the provisions of Article XVI of GATT 1994 (Note to Article XVI) and the provisions of Annexes I through III of this Agreement, the exemption of an exported product from duties or taxes borne by the like product when destined for domestic consumption, or the remission of such duties or taxes in amounts not in excess of those which have accrued, shall not be deemed to be a subsidy.
(iii) a government provides goods or services other than general infrastructure, or purchases goods;
(iv) a government makes payments to a funding mechanism, or entrusts or directs a private body to carry out one or more of the type of functions illustrated in (i) to (iii) above which would normally be vested in the government and the practice, in no real sense, differs from practices normally followed by governments;
or
(a)(2) there is any form of income or price support in the sense of Article XVI of GATT 1994;
and
(b) a benefit is thereby conferred.
[17] 《SCM协定》第1条(a) (1)的(i)、(ii)、(iii)、(iv) 在分别规定“财政资助”的判断依据，事实上，该案并未争论关于热轧钢、贷款以及土地的提供是否构成“财政资助”的问题。
[18] 原文：China challenges as invalid the USDOC's findings in the investigations at issue that SOEs producing inputs, and SOCBs providing loans, were "public bodies" within the meaning of Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement. Therefore, China considers inconsistent with that Article the USDOC's determinations that the provision of inputs and of loans by these entities constituted financial contributions by public bodies. China argues that in the absence of evidence that these entities were vested with and exercised governmental authority, as a matter of law their actions needed to be deemed those of private, not public bodies. Panel Report (379) , para. 8.3.
[19] 原文：Given this, only if the USDOC had found that these entities were "entrusted or directed" in the sense of Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) of the SCM Agreement to provide the inputs or the loans could it have lawfully concluded that that the financial contributions were made by the Government of China. Panel Report(379) , para. 8.3.
[20] 原文：China maintains that because the USDOC did not examine whether there had been such entrustment or direction, its determinations of financial contributions by the Government of China were inconsistent with Article 1.1 of the SCM Agreement. Panel Report(379) , para. 8.3.
[21] 类似主张：China asserts that it is not arguing that government-owned entities can never be public bodies within the meaning of Article 1.1(a)(1), but rather that their conduct should be deemed presumptively private, and consistent with that presumption, their conduct ordinarily should be examined under the entrustment or direction standard of Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) of the SCM Agreement. If the evidence in a particular case established that a government-owned entity was exercising delegated authority to perform functions of a governmental character, then it would be appropriate to conclude that it was a public body and that subparagraph (iv) was inapplicable. But absent such evidence, China argues, subparagraph (iv) should apply and there is no legitimate justification in the text, context or object and purpose of the SCM Agreement for the arbitrary test the United States has advanced that would make such entities public bodies in all cases merely by virtue of their government ownership. Panel Report(379) , para. 8.6.
[22] 中国确信国有企业不执行政府职能，这是对其有利的事实证据，事实上，世界各国的国有企业中执行政府职能的应该是微乎其微，因为，国有企业本来就不是为执行政府职能而设立的实体。
[23] 依据上述中国的解释（以能够成立为条件），因为“国有企业”被排除于“公共机构”（通常是不执行政府职能的）的范围，若试图将“国有企业”纳入补贴提供主体范围，可选择的办法就是按照《SCM协定》第1条1.1(a)(1)(iv)的规定来证明“国有企业”也与“私营企业”一样，是受到了来自政府的“指示”或“委托”后提供了原材料和贷款，不然无法认定政府提供了“财政资助”。
[24] WT/DS296/AB/R : United States – Countervailing Duty Investigation on Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors (DRAMS) from Korea (27 June 2005, Report of the Appellate Body).
[25] 原文：China argues that the Appellate Body recognized in US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS that under well-established principles of customary international law, the actions of state-owned corporate entities are prima facie private, and thus presumptively not attributable to a Member under Article 1.1 of the SCM Agreement. Panel Report(379) , para. 8.4. 关于如何解释《SCM协定》第1条规定的“公共机构”，中国在援引“美国对韩国半导体反补贴调查案”上诉机构报告中对国际习惯法的确认。因为争论的是《SCM协定》规定的用语（“公共机构”），在论证法律依据时，按道理不应该提被争论的协定。“…and thus presumptively not attributable to a Member under Article 1.1 of the SCM Agreement”中的“under Article 1.1 of the SCM Agreement”的意思是什么呢？需要中国作出说明。
[26] 这是中国引用的“美国对韩国半导体反补贴调查案”上诉机构报告的原文，从中可以看出，该案上诉机构援引了“美国出口限制构成补贴案”上诉机构所做的解释。
[27] 原文：China argues that instead of focusing as it should have on whether the SOEs and SOCBs were "private bodies" that had been "entrusted or directed" by the Government of China or a public body to provide inputs and loans, respectively, the USDOC relied on a per se rule of majority government ownership in determining that these entities were "public bodies". Panel Report(379) , para. 8.4.
[28] 原文：In China's view, this interpretation of the term "public body" is impermissible under a correct application of the principles of treaty interpretation. Panel Report(379) , para. 8.4.
[29] 原文：For China, while government ownership is relevant to the question of control, and thus to the inquiry in Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) as to whether a private body has been directed to perform governmental functions, ownership has little relevance in determining whether an entity is a public body. Panel Report(379) , para. 8.4.
[30] 如上所述，中国承认，只有在不能提出“国有企业”在执行政府职能的证据时，才将其行为视为“私营机构”的行为，这说明，没有前者后者是无法成立的，事实上，有关“国有企业”执行政府职能的证明是对“公共机构”作出解释之后的事情。
[31] 应详细考察关于国有企业行为的国际习惯法原则的背景和适用条件。DSU未作出关于适用规则的一般性规定，《WTO协定》构成争端解决程序的适用规则是当然的事情。DSU中涉及到除《WTO协定》以外的国际法规则的规定如下：
Article 3 General Provisions
2. The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system. The Members recognize that it serves to preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the covered agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law. Recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements. 该规定所指的“关于解释国际法的习惯规则”是指《维也纳条约法公约》第31条和第32条（习惯规则的法典化），这是WTO争端解决机制专家组和上诉机构一致承认的法律问题。

　
　　
[32] Article 32 Supplementary means of interpretation
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31: (a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.
[33] WT/DS103/AB/R, WT/DS113/AB/R:CANADA – MEASURES AFFECTING THE IMPORTATION OF MILK AND THE EXPORTATION OF DAIRY PRODUCTS(13 October 1999, Report of the Appellate Body).
[34] 原文：China asserts, to be a "public body", an entity must be authorized by the law of the state to exercise functions of a governmental or public character, and the acts in question must be performed in the exercise of such authority. Panel Report(379) , para. 8.5.
[35] 原文：In this context China, paraphrasing the Appellate Body in Canada – Dairy, argues that a "public body" should be defined as "an entity which exercises powers [or authority] vested in it by a 'government' for the purpose of performing functions of a 'governmental' character". Panel Report(379) , para. 8.5.
[36] 《农业协定》AGREEMENT ON AGRICULTURE
Article 9 Export Subsidy Commitments
1. The following export subsidies are subject to reduction commitments under this Agreement:
(a) the provision by governments or their agencies of direct subsidies, including payments-in-kind, to a firm, to an industry, to producers of an agricultural product, to a cooperative or other association of such producers, or to a marketing board, contingent on export performance;
[37] 原文：According to China, what distinguishes the conduct of public bodies from that of private bodies is not the degree of government ownership – the government may have ownership interests in both – but the source and nature of the authority the entities possess and exercise. Panel Report(379) , para. 8.5. 本文在反复重复，该案争论的主题是“公共机构”的含义，不是“公共机构”和“私营机构”的区别，更不是如何对待“国有企业”的问题。就算争论也罢，事实上，在考察“公共机构”和“私营机构”的区别时，国家所有的程度是具有决定性的依据。政府在“公共机构”和“私营机构”两者中均保留所有权这一事实不能成为否定所有权法律功能的根据，正是国家所有权在决定实体的性质。“公共机构”的半数以上所有权一定是掌握在国家手中的。国家可以掌握部分私营机构的所有权，但其所有程度达不到控制实体的程度时，仍然是“私有机构”。换言之，同样是由国家掌握所有权的实体，因国家掌握的所有权是否超过半数为标准，性质可以或“公”或“私”，两者是完全不同的。
[38] 原文：China states therefore that in the investigations at issue in the present dispute, absent actual evidence establishing that the state-owned entities were vested with authority to exercise governmental authority in connection with the provision of the alleged financial contributions at issue, as a matter of law those entities' actions must be deemed to be those of private entities. Panel Report(379) , para. 8.5.
[39] 原文：China relies on various dictionary definitions of the term "public" to argue that the ordinary meaning of the term "public body" requires the essential elements that such an entity acts for the welfare and best interests of a nation or community as a whole, and does so under the authority, or officially on behalf, of the nation or community as a whole. Panel Report(379) , para. 8.7.
[40] 原文：China argues further that the phrase in Article 1.1(a)(1), "a government or other public body" explicitly equates, and treats as "functional equivalents", the terms "government" and "public body". Panel Report(379) , para. 8.7.
[41] 原文：According to China, the Agreement differentiates between this type of entity and "private bodies" in Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv), the actions of which require "entrustment or direction" from a government to perform one of the functions enumerated in Article 1.1(a)(1)(i)-(iii) in order to be deemed financial contributions by a government. Panel Report(379) , para. 8.7.
[42] 原文：For China, the fact that entrustment or direction of the actions of private bodies brings those actions within the purview of "government financial contribution" demonstrates that in all cases, the sine qua non of a "financial contribution" is the exercise of some element of governmental authority in connection with performing functions of a governmental character. Panel Report(379) , para. 8.7.
[43] 原文：China also considers that the definitions of the corresponding French and Spanish terms "organisme public" and "organismo público" in Article 1.1 of the SCM Agreement support its argument concerning the ordinary meaning of the term "public body". Panel Report(379) , para. 8.8.
[44] 原文：China argues that all three terms are presumed to have the same meaning under Article 33(3) of the Vienna Convention, and that the Panel must examine this meaning. Panel Report(379) , para. 8.8.
[45] 原文：According to China, the French term "public" and the Spanish term "público" connote "governmental", which is consistent with several dictionary definitions of the English term "public". China also points to the OECD Economics Glossary which it argues equates "organisme public" with the English term "government agency". Panel Report(379) , para. 8.8.
[46] 原文：China further argues that in the Agreement on Agriculture the Spanish term "organismo público" is expressly equated to the English term "government agency", and that the Appellate Body in Canada - Dairy established unequivocally that the same Spanish and French terms at issue in Article 1.1 of the SCM Agreement have the same meaning as the English term "government agency". Panel Report(379) , para. 8.8.
[47] 原文：According to China, Article 33 of the Vienna Convention requires the Panel to interpret the English term "public body" consistently with the fact that the French and Spanish versions of that term mean "government agency", and the only coherent way to do so is to interpret the English terms "public body" and "government agency" as functional equivalents, just as they are treated in the French and Spanish languages. Panel Report(379) , para. 8.8.
[48] Article 33(Interpretation of treaties authenticted in tow or more languages):
4. Except where a particular text prevails in accordance with paragaph 1, when a comparison of the ahthentic text discloses a difference of meaning which the application of articles 31 and 32 dose not remove, the meaning which best reconciles the texts, having regard to the object and purpose of the treaty, shall be adapted.
[49] 原文：China disagrees with the United States concerning the meaning of the conjunction "or" in Article 1.1(a)(1) between the terms "government" and "public body". Panel Report(379) , para. 8.9.
[50] 原文：In China's view, this word does not suggest that the two terms must have wholly dissimilar and unrelated meanings, but only that the terms are not identical. Panel Report(379) , para. 8.9. 毕竟中国还在承认“公共机构”和“政府”之间存在区别。
[51] WT/DS194/R: UNITED STATES - MEASURES TREATING EXPORTS RESTRAINTS AS SUBSIDIES (29 June 2001, Report of the Panel), para.8.32.
[52] 原文：China argues that "or" frequently connects words or phrases that are similar or functional equivalents, and cites the report of the US – Export Restraints panel's reference to the word "or" between the phrases "a government makes payments to a funding mechanism" and "entrusts or directs a private body" in subparagraph (iv) of Article 1.1(a)(1) as meaning that the two phrases captured equivalent government actions. Panel Report(379) , para. 8.9.
[53] WT/DS194/R: UNITED STATES - MEASURES TREATING EXPORTS RESTRAINTS AS SUBSIDIES (29 June 2001, Report of Panel).
[54] 原文：China also disagrees with the United States concerning the significance of the adjective "any" to modify "public body" in Article 1.1(a)(1) of the Agreement. Panel Report(379) , para. 8.10.
[55] 原文：According to China, the "any" only indicates that all entities that qualify as public bodies – however that term is defined – are captured within the scope of Article 1.1, but says nothing about the characteristics that define a public body, and offers no support for the United States' per se majority government ownership test. Panel Report(379) , para. 8.10.
[56] 原文：China argues that its interpretation of the term "public body" also is supported contextually by the General Agreement on Trade in Services (the "GATS"). According to China, paragraph 5(c)(i) of the Annex on Financial Services to the GATS (the "GATS Financial Services Annex") defines the term "public entity" as an "entity owned or controlled by a Member, that is principally engaged in carrying out governmental functions or activities for governmental purposes ...". Panel Report(379) , para. 8.11.
[57] 原文：For China, this definition reflects a similar view of the functional equivalence between "government" and "public body" that, in China's view, exists in Article 1.1 of the SCM Agreement. Panel Report(379) , para. 8.11.
[58] 原文：In addition, China argues, the GATS definition indicates that when an entity is "merely 'owned or controlled by a Member'", it will qualify as a public entity only if it is "carrying out governmental functions or activities for governmental purposes", that entities owned or controlled by governments may carry out both governmental and commercial functions, and that they are deemed to be "public" only when principally engaged in the former. Panel Report(379) , para. 8.11.
[59] 原文：According to China, Article I:3(a) of the GATS also provides relevant context by defining "measures by Members" to include measures by governmental actors ("central, regional or local governments or authorities") and non-governmental bodies "in the exercise of powers delegated by central, regional or local governments or authorities". Panel Report(379) , para. 8.11.
[60] 原文：China argues that if the actions of non-governmental bodies may be attributed to a Member for purposes of the GATS only when they are exercising authority delegated to them by the government, it is difficult to envision any rational justification for applying any less demanding a standard for attributing the actions of a "public body" to a Member under Article 1.1 of the Agreement. Panel Report(379) , para. 8.11.
[61]《服务贸易总协定》前言规定：“希望建立一个服务贸易原则和规则的多边框架，以期在透明和逐步自由化的条件下扩大此类贸易，并以此为手段促进所有贸易伙伴的经济增长和发展中国家的发展；期望在给予国家政策目标应有尊重的同时，通过连续回合的多边谈判，在互利基础上促进所有参加方的利益，并保证权利和义务的总体平衡，以便早日实现服务贸易自由化的逐步提高”。
[62] 拆除或减少阻挡商品流通的国境措施（贸易壁垒）是贸易自由化的首要工作。《WTO协定》规范的国境措施主要是指关税、数量限制、卫生检疫、产品的技术规格、海关估价、原产地规则等。
[63] 目前，《WTO协定》尚未做出有关减少或减轻国内管理措施以解放国内市场商品流通的法律规定，WTO成员只要不实施歧视进口产品的国内管理措施即可，即国民待遇原则的遵守。所以，《WTO协定》的绝大部分内容是规范国境措施的。
[64] AGREEMENT ESTABLISHING THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION Article III Functions of the WTO
1. The WTO shall facilitate the implementation, administration and operation, and further the objectives, of this Agreement and of the Multilateral Trade Agreements, and shall also provide the framework for the implementation, administration and operation of the Plurilateral Trade Agreements.
3. The WTO shall administer the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (hereinafter referred to as the "Dispute Settlement Understanding" or "DSU") in Annex 2 to this Agreement.
4. The WTO shall administer the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (hereinafter referred to as the "TPRM") provided for in Annex 3 to this Agreement. 这里的AGREEMENT ESTABLISHING THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION是指狭义《WTO协定》，其内容限于正文的16条，不包括附件在内。the Multilateral Trade Agreements是指附件1、2、3，the Plurilateral Trade Agreements是指附件4. 这些协定的共性可概括为“为实现贸易自由化对政府贸易管理措施的约束和规范”。
[65] PART II: PROHIBITED SUBSIDIES
Article 3 Prohibition
3.1 Except as provided in the Agreement on Agriculture, the following subsidies, within the meaning of Article 1, shall be prohibited:
(a) subsidies contingent, in law or in fact , whether solely or as one of several other conditions, upon export performance, including those illustrated in Annex I.
(b) subsidies contingent, whether solely or as one of several other conditions, upon the use of domestic over imported goods.
[66] 《服务贸易总协定》Article XVI Market Access
2. In sectors where market-access commitments are undertaken, the measures which a Member shall not maintain or adopt either on the basis of a regional subdivision or on the basis of its entire territory, unless otherwise specified in its Schedule, are defined as:
(a) limitations on the number of service suppliers whether in the form of numerical quotas, monopolies, exclusive service suppliers or the requirements of an economic needs test;
(b) limitations on the total value of service transactions or assets in the form of numerical quotas or the requirement of an economic needs test;
(c) limitations on the total number of service operations or on the total quantity of service output expressed in terms of designated numerical units in the form of quotas or the requirement of an economic needs test;（以下省略）
[67] 如前所述，补贴定义以及反补贴税是以贸易自由化为前提的法律问题，如果没有贸易自由化，无论政府给本国企业提供多大的补贴并增强其竞争力，至少在国际层面上是不会成为问题的。
[68] 原文：China refers to the International Law Commission's Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (the "Draft Articles") as compelling its interpretation of the term "public body" in Article 1.1 of the SCM Agreement. Panel Report(379) , para. 8.12.
[69] 原文：According to China, as a general matter prior panels and the Appellate Body have considered the Draft Articles "relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties", in the sense of Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention, for purposes of interpreting the covered agreements. Panel Report(379) , para. 8.12.
[70] 原文：In this regard, concerning the interpretation of Article 1.1 of the SCM Agreement, China recalls that in US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS the Appellate Body referred to the Draft Articles in the section of its report entitled "The meaning of the terms 'entrusts' and 'directs'" in Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv). In particular, China notes the Commentary to Article 8 of the Draft Articles, to which the Appellate Body referred in a footnote in the US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS report. Panel Report(379) , para. 8.13.
[71] 原文：According to China, this passage of the Commentary makes clear that state ownership is not sufficient to attribute the conduct of a state-owned corporate entity to a state, and by extension to a Member for purposes of Article 1.1 of the SCM Agreement, and that instead it supports China's view of the term "public body". Panel Report(379) , para. 8.13.
[72] 原文：Furthermore, in China's view, the Appellate Body's citation of this passage demonstrates that the Draft Articles are "relevant rules of international law" for purposes of interpreting the WTO Agreement, and thus must be relied upon in the present dispute in determining whether the USDOC's determination that the SOEs and SOCBs were public bodies was consistent with the SCM Agreement. Panel Report(379) , para. 8.13.
[73] 该案未进入上诉级阶段就解决了争端。“韩国影响商用船舶贸易案”专家组报告：WT/DS273/R: KOREA – MEASURES AFFECTING TRADE IN COMMERCIAL VESSELS(7 March 2005, Report of the Panel).
[74] 原文：China further argues that to the extent that the panel in Korea – Commercial Vessels can be read as endorsing a test for determining whether an entity is a public body solely by reference to government ownership or control, its reasoning is not persuasive and should not be followed. Panel Report(379) , para. 8.14.
[75] 原文：China argues in this regard that among other errors, that panel failed to acknowledge the mandatory nature of recourse to customary principles of international law under Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention, an oversight that in China's view cannot be reconciled with what it considers the Appellate Body's express reliance on the Draft Articles in interpreting Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) of the SCM Agreement. Panel Report(379) , para. 8.14.
[76] 原文：According to China, defining "public body" solely by reference to government ownership or control cannot be reconciled with the Appellate Body's recognition in US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS, consistent with customary international law, that the conduct of a state-owned corporate entity presumptively is not attributable to a government unless that entity is exercising governmental authority within the meaning of Article 5, or determined to be under the direction or control of the State within the meaning of Article 8, of the Draft Articles. Panel Report(379) , para. 8.14.
[77] 原文：Here, China disagrees with the argument advanced by the United States that a majority ownership rule is necessary to "prevent circumvention of the SCM Agreement […] so that subsidizing governments cannot hide behind their ownership interests in enterprises to avoid the reach of the SCM Agreement." Panel Report(379) , para. 8.15 .
[78] 原文：Concerning the object and purpose of the SCM Agreement, China considers that the United States' interpretation, if accepted, would have far-reaching and troubling implications for the proper application of the SCM Agreement. Panel Report(379) , para. 8.15.
[79] 原文：China considers this to be a baseless concern, because subparagraph (iv) of Article 1.1 is an acknowledged anti-circumvention provision that squarely addresses it. Panel Report(379) , para. 8.15
[80] China also disagrees with what it views as the United States' argument that the entrustment or direction standard is too burdensome and might be evaded when government-owned entities are involved. Panel Report(379) , para. 8.15.
[81] 原文 China is concerned that if the position of the United States is accepted, subparagraph (iv) would become a dead letter for entities with majority government ownership – a category of entities to which, in China's view, subparagraph (iv) was previously considered applicable by both panels and WTO Members alike. Panel Report(379) , para. 8.15.
[82] 原文：China considers that the interpretation advocated by the United States, which in its view is not based on the actual treaty standards, would flout the object and purpose of the SCM Agreement. Panel Report(379) , para. 8.16.
[83] 原文：In particular, China argues, the SCM Agreement "reflects a delicate balance between the Members that sought to impose more disciplines on the use of subsidies and those that sought to impose more disciplines on the application of countervailing measures". Both aspects of this "balance" are evident in Article 1.1, including the "discipline" imposed by the entrustment or direction standard. Panel Report(379) , para. 8.16.
[84] 原文：For China, the possibility that it may not be easy, as a practical matter, to meet the standards of a covered agreement has never dissuaded the Appellate Body from strictly enforcing those standards, and it urges the Panel to be guided by the same approach here. Panel Report(379) , para. 8.16.
[85]《维也纳条约法公约》相关规定：Article 31 General rule of interpretation
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.
[86] Article 5 Adverse Effects
No Member should cause, through the use of any subsidy referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 1, adverse effects to the interests of other Members, i.e.:
(a) injury to the domestic industry of another Member;
(b) nullification or impairment of benefits accruing directly or indirectly to other Members under GATT 1994 in particular the benefits of concessions bound under Article II of GATT1994;
(c) serious prejudice to the interests of another Member.
[87] 原文：China criticizes the USDOC for not applying the five-factor test that it had applied in certain prior cases. Panel Report(379) , para. 8.18.
[88] 原文：(i) government ownership; (ii) the government's presence on the entity's board of directors; (iii) the government's control over the entity's activities; (iv) the entity's pursuit of governmental policies or interests; and (v) whether the entity is created by statute. Panel Report(379) , para. 8.18.
[89] 原文：China argues that in some prior cases where this test was applied, the USDOC had found that even 100 per cent government-owned entities were not public bodies under U.S. law, and thus could not convey financial contributions unless they were "entrusted or directed" to do so. Panel Report(379) , para. 8.18.
[90] 原文：According to the United States, these past cases indicate that the USDOC approaches public body issues on a case-by-case basis, with the five-factor test usually arising where there is not clear evidence of government ownership or control. For the United States, this makes sense as most of the five factors relate to ownership or control of an entity. Panel Report(379) , para. 8.38.
[91] 原文：The United States thus considers that these past decisions do not indicate a USDOC interpretation of the "public body" language in the SCM Agreement. Concerning the DRAMS from Korea investigation, the United States recalls that the USDOC analyzed five factors and, as China notes, concluded that certain 100 per cent government-owned banks in that case were not public bodies. The United States submits that the critical factor public bodies was that, as the USDOC stated in that investigation, "temporary [government] explaining this determination that 100 per cent government-owned banks were not necessarily ownership of the banks due to the financial crisis is not, by itself, indicative that these banks are [government] authorities". Then, in the DRAMS from Korea investigation, an analysis of more than ownership, and even of entrustment or direction for some banks, was necessary due to the fact that the Korean government had assumed many temporary ownership stakes as a result of the Korean financial crisis. Panel Report(379) , para. 8.39.
[92] 原文：The United States further notes that in a subsequent countervailing duty administrative review of Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Flat Products from India, the USDOC found that a 98 per cent government-owned mining company governed by the Ministry of Steel was a public body, without reference to any more factors. Panel Report(379) , para. 8.39.
[93] 原文：While China asserts that it is not raising before the Panel the consistency with Article 1.1 of the SCM Agreement of the five-factor test, China also takes issue with the USDOC's statements in three of the investigations in the present dispute that there was insufficient record evidence to apply the five-factor test as, beyond the levels of government ownership for some companies, the Government of China had not provided the information needed to apply the test. Panel Report(379) , para. 8.18.
[94] 原文：China argues that this statement indicates that for the USDOC any provision of goods by a state-owned entity may be presumed to be a financial contribution unless there is evidence establishing that the entity is not a public body. Panel Report(379) , para. 8.18.
[95] 原文：China states that the five-factor test is relevant for this dispute to establish that prior to the investigations at issue, the USDOC had recognized that determining whether a state-owned entity qualified as a public entity was a multi-factor, fact-intensive inquiry even under U.S. law. Panel Report(379) , para. 8.18.
[96] 原文：China considers that the USDOC improperly shifted the burden to the Government of China to disprove the presumption that all SOEs are public bodies, thereby abrogating its responsibilities as an investigating authority. Panel Report(379) , para. 8.18.
[97] 原文：In this context, China cites a statement by the Appellate Body that "the investigating authority has a duty to seek out information on relevant factors and evaluate their probative value in order to ensure that its determination is based not on presumptions, but on a sufficient factual basis". Panel Report(379) , para. 8.18.